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WHY BARTLETT IS NOT THE END OF 
AGGREGATED MINORITY GROUP CLAIMS 
UNDER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
SCOTTY SCHENCK† 
ABSTRACT 
  The 2020 election showed the importance of faith in the democratic 
system and the ability for citizens to cast a ballot for federal, state, and 
local races. After the election, state legislatures will be redrawing 
federal, state, and local electoral districts. Those new districts will affect 
the voting rights of nearly every American. This Note examines Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which has traditionally afforded 
minority group members the opportunity to challenge discriminatory 
electoral policies that thwart the ability “to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice.” This is an 
important avenue that minority group members can seek to remediate 
biased districting processes. 
  Claims brought by one minority group at a time—such as a Black 
community suing to be a majority in a newly drawn electoral district 
after being discriminated against in the district drawing process—have 
been commonplace for several decades. But given the diversifying 
country, these standard challenges are becoming insufficient. A newer 
and more controversial theory pursued by litigants under Section 2 is 
the “aggregated claim”—which is a joint claim brought by two or more 
minority groups saying essentially, “We’ve been discriminated against 
collectively.” This Note asks the question of whether aggregated claims 
are permitted under Section 2 and argues that they are. In particular, 
this Note examines the impact of a 2009 Supreme Court case, Bartlett 
v. Strickland, on the viability of aggregated claims, and makes a novel 
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argument based on statutory interpretation that such claims should be 
permitted. 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly three decades, constitutional law has required that 
plaintiffs in racial gerrymandering suits prove the heavy burden that 
race was the predominant motive for redistricting.1 In 2017, the 
Supreme Court limited the ability of legislatures to use race as a tool 
to achieve representation for minorities—requiring its use to be 
remedial and necessary to avoid a potential Section 2 claim.2 In 2019, 
the Court dealt another blow to voting rights activists when it held that 
partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable,3 possibly making it 
easier for racialized districting to be done under the guise of 
nonjusticiable political gerrymandering.  
Taking these developments together, voting rights advocates will 
look to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) to ensure minority 
populations can fully participate in the civic process.4 Passed pursuant 
to congressional powers created by the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
VRA outlawed various discriminatory tactics, such as poll taxes and 
literacy tests, and created causes of action to challenge the effects of 
discriminatory election systems.5 Unlike racial gerrymandering claims 
that are typically brought as a constitutional cause of action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and require proof of intentional 
discrimination,6 claims under Section 2 of the VRA apply to 
 
 1. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959–60 (1996).  
 2. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1472 (2017) (noting that while complying with Section 
2 of the VRA is a compelling state interest, districts drawn based on incorrect legal interpretations 
of the VRA would not survive strict scrutiny); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, 
Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the 
VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1590, 1598 (2018) (“Thus, when the government cannot 
justify race-conscious line-drawing on remedial grounds . . . a racial districting plan will not 
survive strict scrutiny.”). 
 3. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).  
 4. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2147–48 (2015) (describing 
how Section 2 can function as an effective means to challenge districting). 
 5. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, §§ 4(a), (c), (e)(1), 10, 79 Stat. 437, 438–
39, 442. 
 6. Interestingly, the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of ratification did not promise 
enfranchisement. See Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 
1549, 1565, 1602 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment] (“[T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment was originally understood to not protect political rights.”). Rather, this 
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discriminatory effects.7 This difference is critical, especially for elected 
bodies, given that intent is difficult to prove.8 Thus, the VRA (as 
amended) made redress of discrimination significantly easier to 
achieve for marginalized persons.  
A vote dilution claim is one common method of challenging 
election districts under Section 2. A minority community can challenge 
election systems or processes as having a discriminatory effect if “the 
political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally 
open to participation by members of a [protected class].”9 Like with 
gerrymandering, vote dilution affects the power of one’s vote, not one’s 
ability to cast a ballot. Plaintiffs can challenge districting that dilutes 
minority voting power, for which a common remedy is to create one or 
more new single-member districts (those in which one official is elected 
from a given district), each with a majority–minority population.10  
Section 2 redistricting claims, which this Note focuses on, were 
first brought by single-minority group communities, whether they be 
ethnic or racial minority groups.11 The Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,12 
created three preconditions to these claims. It required claimants as a 
community to show that: (1) they are large and geographically compact 
enough to be a majority within a single-member district; (2) they are 
politically cohesive; and (3) “the [racial] majority votes sufficiently as 
a bloc” to defeat minority-preferred candidates.13 As communities 
became more diverse, two or more minority groups began to bring 
“aggregated claims,” where a cohesive community is made up of one 
or more groups protected by the VRA. For instance, there may be a 
 
was a creation of the Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). Travis Crum, 
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. 261, 264 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, 
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting]. 
 7. See Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018)) (adopting a “results” test for Section 2). 
 8. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016) (discussing the concept of legislative intent, both subjectively and 
objectively).  
 9. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986) (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301).  
 10. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (“[W]e have strongly preferred single-
member districts for federal-court-ordered reapportionment.”). But see Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 
517 U.S. 899, 917 n.9 (1996) (noting that a complainant does not necessarily have “the right to be 
placed in a majority-minority district once a violation of the statute is shown,” because “[s]tates 
retain broad discretion in drawing districts to comply with the mandate of [Section] 2”).  
 11. See, e.g., Growe, 507 U.S. at 34–35 (evaluating a single-minority group claim). 
 12. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 13. Id. at 50–51.  
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claim by a community of Hispanic and Black voters, who form a 
community, typically vote together, and whose voting power is diluted 
by a majority voting bloc in a given district.14 Circuit courts that allow 
aggregated claims apply the Gingles preconditions to the minority 
community collectively, but not all courts, however, have allowed these 
claims to proceed.15  
This absence of uniformity in the circuit courts highlights a central 
question: Does Section 2 even allow aggregated claims? The answer 
has far-reaching implications. American society is becoming 
increasingly racially diverse. By 2060, non-Hispanic White persons will 
account for only 43.6 percent of the American population,16 and 
biracial populations will triple.17 Further, American elections are 
starkly polarized, especially along racial lines.18 Even if some districts 
begin to reflect a pluralistic society,19 there is fear that certain election 
 
 14. I use the term “Hispanic” to track both the statutory language (“of Spanish heritage”), 
52 U.S.C. § 10503(e), and the language used in the relevant caselaw. Additionally, terms like 
Latino and Latina are gendered, and while gender-neutral terms such as Latinx exist, these terms 
are unpopular compared to Hispanic within this community as of the date of publication, and that 
choice should be honored. See Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora & Mark Hugo Lopez, About 
One-in-Four U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3% Use It, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 11, 
2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-have-
heard-of-latinx-but-just-3-use-it [https://perma.cc/MF2M-XNKU]. 
 15. See e.g., Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (prohibiting 
an aggregated claim from proceeding to trial); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 
(5th Cir. 1988) (allowing an aggregated claim composed of Black and Hispanic voters to proceed); 
see also Growe, 507 U.S. at 41 (stating that if aggregated claims were viable, they would be subject 
to the same preconditions as single-minority group claims). 
 16. SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER M. ORTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND 
COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060, at 10 (2015), https://census.gov/content/
dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5VW-JM44].  
 17. Id. In 2014, roughly 2.5 percent of the population identified as “[t]wo or [m]ore [r]aces,” 
which is expected to grow to 6.2 percent by 2060. Id. at 9.  
 18. See Jon Huang, Samuel Jacoby, Michael Strickland & K.K. Rebecca Lai, Election 2016: Exit 
Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-
exit-polls.html [https://perma.cc/X3C5-WASE] (reporting that 88 percent of Black voters and 65 
percent of Hispanic voters cast a ballot for the Democratic nominee, Hillary Clinton, while 58 percent 
of White voters cast a ballot for the Republican nominee, Donald Trump). See generally Election 
Results 2008, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2008/results/president/
national-exit-polls.html [https://perma.cc/6C9W-ZYJ8] (demonstrating correlations between race and 
preferred political party from 1972 to 2008).  
 19. Cf. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., NORTH CAROLINA: 2010 SUMMARY POPULATION 
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 154 (2010) [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA 2010 SUMMARY] (showing 
Durham County as 46.4 percent White, 38 percent Black, 4.6 percent Asian, and 13.5 percent Hispanic). 
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and districting systems could limit the power of minority voices.20 One 
need not look further than the responses to the 2020 election to see this 
concept in action.21 For a further example, legislatures could pack 
minorities into one district to weaken their votes elsewhere.22 Finally, 
the recently closed 2020 census will be used to redraw electoral 
districts, which Section 2 plaintiffs will almost certainly challenge.23  
Though the Supreme Court has not ruled on the viability of 
aggregated claims, it portended issues for them by altering the Gingles 
 
20.See Amended Complaint at 2, 15, 31, McLemore v. Hosemann, 414 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Miss. 
2019) (No. 3:19-cv-383-DPJ-FKB), 2019 WL 7856631 (noting that while Mississippi has the 
highest percentage of Black citizens of any state in America, no Black person has won statewide 
office in 130 years, allegedly due to a rule requiring candidates win the majority of the popular 
vote statewide and win in a majority of the state’s 122 House districts); Ariel Hart, Jeff 
Ernsthausen & David Wickert, Disputed Voting System, Racial Power Gap Persist, ATLANTA J. 
CONST. (Dec. 7, 2013), https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/disputed-voting-
system-racial-power-gap-persist/xwhYqMwM2eGa1kCqMjo2IJ [https://perma.cc/W8KN-2XW5] 
(describing the disparities in representation from at-large elections). 
 21. E.g., S.B. 90, 123d Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); S.B. 202, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2021) (signed into law Mar. 25, 2021); H.B. 3920, 87th Leg. (Tex. 2021); see STATE VOTING BILLS 
TRACKER 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/state-voting-bills-tracker-2021 [https://perma.cc/HK34-FCR2] (listing over 700 
restrictive voting rights bills introduced in forty-three states). Many of these bills seem to be 
concerned with election security. It is, however, peculiar that in addition to alleged security 
measures, some bills like the Georgia state legislature’s make it a criminal offense to hand out 
water to persons standing in line to vote. S.B. 202, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 33 (Ga. 2021) 
(“No person shall . . . give, offer to give, or participate in the giving of any money or gifts, 
including, but not limited to, food and drink, to an elector . . . [w]ithin 25 feet of any voter standing 
in line to vote at any polling place.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-414(h) (West 2021) (making certain 
prohibited actions, which S.B. 202, § 33 will add to, misdemeanors). More concerning, however, 
is that the Georgia bill also adds new identification requirements, limits mail-in voting, and will 
give partisan state election officials the power to temporarily suspend county election 
“superintendents” and elect their own. S.B. 202, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 6, 7, 25 (Ga. 
2021). 
 22. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993) (describing district packing). 
 23. See Wisconsin v. New York, 517 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1996) (noting that the decennial census is used 
to draw federal, state, and local election districts). Although the district drawing process is required 
by federal law, states typically have the responsibility of apportioning federal and local districts. See 
Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” Out of Redistricting: State Constitutional 
Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1253–54 (2007) (“For all practical purposes, 
Wesberry [v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)] and Reynolds [v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)] require a state 
to redistrict immediately following a census—absent some other decennial timetable.”). The process 
has started as of the publication of this Note, and will likely continue for several months, if not years 
depending on litigation. For current progress of the 2021 redistricting process, see Justin Levitt, 
National Overview, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, https://redistricting.lls.edu/national-overview 
[https://perma.cc/942J-TV3X]. To see the timeline of the 2010 census redistricting, see Justin Levitt, 
Maps Across the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, https://redistricting.lls.edu/resources/
maps-across-the-cycle-2010-congress [https://perma.cc/CB3Y-TZ4A]. 
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preconditions. In 2009, the Court in Bartlett v. Strickland24 set a bright-
line requirement (or perhaps more accurately clarified the first Gingles 
precondition) for Section 2 redistricting claims: the minority claimants 
must make up 50 percent or more of the new district they seek.25 The 
Bartlett Court set this rule when considering a crossover claim (as 
opposed to an aggregated claim). In a crossover claim, a minority group 
constitutes less than 50 percent within a new electoral district but could 
elect its representatives with the help of allegedly consistent majority 
“crossover” voters.26 Thus, by adding this new majority requirement, 
the Bartlett Court said, in essence, “no crossover claims.”27 The 
question remains, however, whether or not this logic extends to 
aggregated claims.  
This Note argues that aggregated claims are properly 
distinguishable from the crossover claims left unprotected under 
Bartlett. Aggregated claims significantly differ because they feature 
two or more minority groups combined as one community—a 
community constituting at least 50 percent of the new polity. Indeed, 
White crossover voters are not part of the claim itself. They do not join 
the complaint to the court, are not subject to the statutory tests of 
Section 2, and are not part of the community alleging discrimination.28 
By contrast, all aggregated claimants necessarily assert that they suffer 
from discrimination because of their minority status. Thus, aggregated 
claims are more like single-minority group claims than crossover 
claims, and the Bartlett plurality’s rationales that disallowed crossover 
claims under Section 2 are inapplicable. In other words, this Note 
argues that two or more groups can identify as a single community and 
 
 24. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
 25. Id. at 13 (plurality opinion). 
 26. Id. at 19. In a crossover claim, a minority group constitutes less than 50 percent within a 
new single-member district but could elect its representatives with the help of majority (typically 
White) “crossover” voters. Id.  
 27. The rationales given by the Bartlett Court were that crossover claims (1) are inconsistent 
with the first and third Gingles preconditions; (2) were “contrary to the mandate of [Section] 2,” 
which only guarantees an “equal” opportunity to elect one’s representatives of choice; (3) 
increased racial considerations might run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause; and (4) crossover 
districts instead emphasized racial distinctions instead of continuing progress toward the “waning 
of racism.” Id. at 14–26. By extension, this also meant that legislatures did not have to account for 
crossover effects when redistricting. 
 28. See id. at 11 (noting that only the minority groups of the crossover coalition are subject 
to the Gingles preconditions, and by implication that White crossover voters cannot count 
towards meeting the first precondition).  
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are deserving of the same protection as a single-minority group 
community.  
Scholarly views on aggregated claims under Section 2 are split. 
Early literature turned to a statutory text and intent debate over 
whether the VRA could support such claims.29 After Bartlett, a dispute 
arose among scholarly commentators as to whether aggregated claims 
were dead in the water just like crossover claims,30 because of strong 
 
 29. Compare Sebastian Geraci, The Case Against Allowing Multiracial Coalitions To File 
Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389, 390–93 (“[T]he legislative history of the 
VRA suggests that multiracial coalitions are not permissible.”), and Christopher E. Skinnell, Why 
Courts Should Forbid Minority Coalition Plaintiffs Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
Absent Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 363, 377 (“Just because 
Congress clearly intended to interfere with state election systems by passing and amending the 
VRA, it does not inevitably follow that courts should infer an intention to interfere to such a 
degree as to encompass minority coalitions.”), with Katherine I. Butler & Richard Murray, 
Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minority Groups: Can a “Rainbow 
Coalition” Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?, 21 PAC. L.J. 619, 623–24 (1990) 
(“Ultimately we conclude that the dilution suit . . . should be extended to protect a ‘minority 
coalition’ only in the most unusual of circumstances.”), Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism: 
Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral 
Patterns, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 403, 427–32 (2015) (noting that using the Bartlett rule to 
prohibit aggregation runs counter to the purposes of the VRA, does not lessen the use of race in 
district drawing, and would reduce the number of VRA claims), Sara Michaloski, A Tale of Two 
Minority Groups: Can Two Different Minority Groups Bring a Coalition Suit Under Section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 271, 274 (2014) (noting that allowing 
aggregation “best accords with the fundamental purpose and underlying congressional intent of 
the statute”), Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two 
or More Minority Groups: When Is the Whole Greater than the Sum of Its Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH. 
L. REV. 95, 126–29, 153–54 (1989) (warning that aggregated claims may require federal courts to 
“protect political coalitions” and be dragged into “the world of interest group politics,” but noting 
that in some narrow cases it may be necessary), and Aylon M. Schulte, Note, Minority 
Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Towards Just Representation in Ethnically 
Diverse Communities, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 441, 467–74 (arguing that “aggregation . . . moves 
toward more equitable representation” and noting that although the text of Section 2 is silent on 
whether aggregation is allowed, the congressional purpose and history support using such claims). 
Kevin Sette concluded that the text and intent of Congress supports aggregated claims. Kevin 
Sette, Note, Are Two Minorities Equal to One?: Minority Coalition Groups and Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 88 FORD. L. REV. 2693, 2734 (2020) (arguing that the term “class of citizens” 
can support multiple minority groups).  
 30. This Note does not address, rehash, or engage in the early scholarly debate in depth. But 
for a brief overview of the scholarship, compare Michael Li & Yurij Rudensky, Rethinking the 
Redistricting Toolbox, 62 HOWARD L.J. 713, 724–26 (2019) (“[I]t is easy to see how, without 
additional developments in the field, the Court’s logic from Bartlett could be imported to thwart 
coalition voting rights efforts on communities of color.”), Audrey Yang, Treading Carefully After 
Shelby County: Minority Coalitions Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 701, 702 (“While not the same as a minority coalition, the rejection of crossover districts indicate 
that the Court would maybe not support aggregation either.”), and Lauren R. Weinberg, Note, 
Reading the Tea Leaves: The Supreme Court and the Future of Coalition Districts Under Section 2 of 
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statements against increased racial considerations and the fact that 
individual minority groups in an aggregated claim might be insufficient 
under Bartlett, even though the Court explicitly reserved this 
question.31 This Note differentiates itself by, first, focusing primarily on 
Bartlett’s impact and, second, providing a still-novel statutory 
contribution through what this Note calls the singular–plural canon of 
statutory interpretation.32 
Part I describes the history and doctrine of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and the VRA as repeated congressional attempts to 
provide representation for marginalized groups. It details the history 
of the law, some relevant terminology for voting dilution claims, and 
the current governing legal standards. Part II addresses both 
aggregated and crossover claims in the context of Section 2. It discusses 
the rationales from the Bartlett plurality to demonstrate that 
 
the Voting Rights Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 411, 430 (2013) (“However, the Supreme Court’s 
previous treatment of this and similar issues suggests that it is unlikely that the Perry Court intended 
to resolve whether section 2 requires the creation of coalition districts in such a cryptic fashion.”), 
with Matthew Drecun, Stemming the Tide: Texas’s Demographic Change, the Voting Rights Act, and 
the Emerging Importance of Bartlett v. Strickland, 22 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 103, 134 (2016) 
(“Minority-coalition districts present different considerations than crossover districts, so the issue 
should not necessarily be settled by the logic of Bartlett.”), and Ryan P. Haygood, The Dim Side Of 
The Bright Line: Minority Voting Opportunity After Bartlett v. Strickland, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
(Feb. 25, 2010), at 14–15, https://harvardcrcl.org/the-dim-side-of-the-bright-line-minority-voting-
opportunity-after-bartlett-v-strickland-by-ryan-p-haygood [https://perma.cc/5HKU-C5Y7] (arguing 
that aggregated claims should be allowed).  
 31. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13–14 (plurality opinion) (“[C]oalition-district claims [are those] 
in which two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition’s choice. We 
do not address that type of coalition district here.”).  
 32. Thus, instead of arguing that “class” of citizens can hold multiple groups, as circuit courts 
and other articles or notes have done, this Note argues that even if it could not support that 
interpretation, “class” implicitly contains the plural term “classes” because there is no text which 
overrides this statutory presumption. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (noting that, “unless the context 
indicates otherwise,” that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, 
parties, or things [and] words importing the plural include the singular”). This Note employs the 
phrase “singular–plural canon of statutory construction,” to help simplify discussion because 
caselaw typically refers to this canon by the statutory text of 1 U.S.C. § 1, which is often unwieldy. 
See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 422 n.5 (2009) (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 1); id. at 432 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (same). Authors use various phrasings in the literature. See, e.g., Grace E. Hart, 
State Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 438, 458 (2016) 
(calling this canon the “singular/plural rule”); BJ Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: 
Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185 (2010) (referring to 
this rule as the “singular includes the plural” canon). Justice Antonin Scalia and his co-author 
Bryan Garner referred to this cannon as the “Gender/Number Canon” in their treatise on textual 
interpretation. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION 
OF LEGAL TEXTS 129–31 (2012). 
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aggregated claims remain permissible. Indeed, Bartlett does not end the 
argument over aggregated claims, given the substantive differences 
between aggregated and crossover claims. Part III discusses the history 
of a circuit split surrounding the application of Section 2 to aggregated 
claims and advances a novel statutory argument. Specifically, the 
singular phrasing of Section 2—using “class” instead of “classes”—
does not preclude aggregation because of the singular–plural canon of 
interpretation.33  
I.  THE HISTORY AND DOCTRINE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE VRA (1870–2009) 
Reconstruction in America marked the end of the bloody Civil 
War and the start of a new era in American democracy, where the 
tenets of federalism and states’ rights were permanently altered. 
Notably, the Reconstruction Congress passed three amendments to the 
Constitution—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments.34 The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he 
right . . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”35 It, like other Reconstruction Amendments, confers on 
Congress the power to “enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.”36 The Reconstruction period lasted from 1865 to 1877, 
where the Union occupied and oversaw the southern states under 
military rule.37 Congress was controlled by Republicans who passed 
several pieces of legislation aimed at reversing the effects of slavery.38 
This effort included three constitutional amendments and several 
“Reconstruction” acts, such as the Enforcement Act of 187039 and the 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, to prevent southern violence at the polls.40  
 
 33. 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 34. The Reconstruction Amendments, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/learn/
educational-resources/historical-documents/the-reconstruction-amendments [https://perma.cc/K66E-
CYH2]. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 36. Id. § 2. 
 37. Eric Foner, Reconstruction, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Reconstruction-
United-States-history [https://perma.cc/6LZT-4P46]. 
 38. Id.  
 39. An Act To Enforce the Rights of Citizens of the United States To Vote in the Several 
States of this Union, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870). 
 40. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 14 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986 (2018)). 
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After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 (ratified 
by the States in 1868), which was widely understood at the time of 
ratification not to confer a right of suffrage on freed slaves,41 
Republicans in Congress sought to enfranchise Black voters 
nationwide with various measures, including several Reconstruction 
acts directed at southern states.42 The Republicans in Congress, before 
the waning of their political power, passed the Fifteenth Amendment.43 
Though ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment served as an empty 
promise for decades.44 The right to vote, while treasured, proved hard 
to exercise because of southern violence.45 As a result, from 1870 to 
1880, despite Black citizens constituting 10 to 11 percent of the nation, 
less than 0.5 percent of the members of the House of Representatives 
were Black.46 After Reconstruction ended in 1877, 
underrepresentation became even worse in Congress.47 Soon 
thereafter, the South employed various schemes to dismantle Black 
voting influence, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather 
clauses.48  
 
 41. Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1551, 1585; see CONG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (noting that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not give power to regulate “suffrage in the several States”). 
 42. See supra note 6. 
 43. See Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth Amendment, supra note 6, at 1551 (“Passed by the 
lame-duck Fortieth Congress in 1969 and ratified by the states in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment 
was the final act in the trilogy of the Reconstruction Amendments.”).  
 44. Jamelia N. Morgan, Disparate Impact and Voting Rights: How Objections to Impact-
Based Claims Prevent Plaintiffs from Prevailing in Cases Challenging New Forms of 
Disenfranchisement, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 93, 94 (2018). 
 45. See Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 304, 310 (stating 
that the Fifteenth Amendment proved “insufficient to protect the right of Black voters”).  
 46. IDA A. BRUDNICK & JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30378, AFRICAN 
AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870–2020, at 4–6 (2020), https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL30378 [https://perma.cc/4AY6-7QM4]; CENSUS BUREAU, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., UNITED STATES SUMMARY: 2010 POPULATION AND HOUSING UNIT COUNTS 4–
5 tbl.3 (2012), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-2-1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GNY5-9HU5]; CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., 1880 CENSUS VOLUME 1: 
POPULATION, BY RACE, SEX, AND NATIVITY 3 tbl.1(a) (1883), https://www2.census.gov/library/
publications/decennial/1880/vol-01-population/1880_v1-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZWS-M9L9] (noting 
the overall population was 40,155,783 as compared to the Black population of 6,580,793 in 1880). 
 47. IDA A. BRUDNICK & JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30378, AFRICAN 
AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: 1870–2018, at 5–6 (2018), https://
www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/617f17bb-61e9-40bb-b301-50f48fd239fc.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPJ7-H4YC]. 
 48. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1959, at 
30–34 (1959); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1966) (describing 
various tactics used by southern states to deprive Black people of the vote); 1 MARSHA J. TYSON 
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Finally, the Supreme Court gutted civil rights laws and weakened 
the reach of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Supreme 
Court did so by invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875,49 limiting the 
Fourteenth Amendment to state action,50 holding that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment only protects legal 
rights under federal, but not state, citizenship,51 and then upholding 
segregation as constitutional.52 The Court also held that the Fifteenth 
Amendment, while preventing exclusion from voting on the basis of 
race, did not affirmatively grant a person the right to vote.53 For 
example, a state could have literacy tests and poll taxes (as of the time 
the Reconstruction Amendments were passed) because these 
qualifications are at least facially unrelated to race, even if they denied 
the right to vote and disproportionately disenfranchised Black voters. 
And, tools like the poll tax persisted well into the twentieth century.54 
In fact, the “white primary”—where political parties adopted rules 
excluding Black voters from voting in primary elections—was ruled 
unconstitutional only as of 1944.55 
It was not until 1965 that conditions seriously began to change 
again. After signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964,56 President Lyndon 
B. Johnson and the Democratic Party turned to voting rights, drafting 
legislation that relied on congressional authority from the Fifteenth 
Amendment.57 The framers of the VRA aimed at eliminating the blight 
 
DARLING, RACE, VOTING, REDISTRICTING AND THE CONSTITUTION xiv (2001) (same). 
Grandfather clauses were found unconstitutional in 1915, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 
366–68 (1915), and poll taxes in federal elections were made illegal by the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, and the Supreme Court held poll taxes in state elections 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
666 (1966). 
 49. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 (1883).  
 50. Id. at 11. 
 51. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 112–13 (1873).  
 52. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). 
 53. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875). 
 54. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding poll taxes in state 
elections unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 55. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944) (holding that state primaries conducted 
by political parties, which are technically private organizations for many purposes, were state 
action for purposes of the Reconstruction Amendments). 
 56. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241.  
 57. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (noting that the VRA 
was enacted “[t]o enforce the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and 
for other purposes”). 
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of racism from the electoral process by outlawing various forms of 
voting denial, including poll taxes and literacy tests.58 In the words of 
President Johnson, “Experience has clearly shown that the existing 
process of law cannot overcome systematic and ingenious 
discrimination. No law that we now have on the books . . . can ensure 
the right to vote when local officials are determined to deny it.”59  
In addition to dealing with plainly discriminatory policies, the 
VRA included two mechanisms to challenge dynamic discriminatory 
tactics. The first of these was Section 5,60 which essentially froze 
election procedures for jurisdictions that met certain statutory 
criteria.61 These jurisdictions would have to get approval from the 
federal government to change their procedures.62 The second 
mechanism, Section 2, originally stated that states and subdivisions 
cannot use any voting practice or procedure that would deny the right 
to vote on account of race.63 Over the VRA’s history, Congress has 
repeatedly enlarged the scope of Section 2. In 1965, Section 2 covered 
only racial minorities, as opposed to ethnic or language minorities.64 In 
1975, Congress amended Section 2 to protect “language minorities,” 
including Asians, Hispanics, Indigenous Peoples, and Alaskan 
 
 58. Id. §§ 4(a), (c), (e)(1), 10, at 438–39, 442; see also U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., U.S. 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, BOOK 1: VOTING 343–51 (1961) (documenting voting 
statistics). For example, while 63.6 percent of White voters in Alabama in 1960 were registered, 
only 13.7 percent of Black voters in the state were. Id. at 343. 
 59. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (Mar. 
15, 1965) (transcript and video available at the LBJ Presidential Library online archive), http://
www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-johnson/speeches-films/president-johnsons-special-message-to-the-
congress-the-american-promise [https://perma.cc/FJ7S-Q6TX] (“And should we defeat every enemy, 
should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and still be unequal to this issue, then we will have 
failed as a people and as a nation.”). 
 60. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2018) (originally enacted as Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439).  
 61. Section 5 froze the election procedures unless a state sought an exemption and its 
companion, Section 4(b), applied a formula to determine which states were covered by Section 5. 
Id. §§ 4–5, at 438–39. Section 4(b)’s coverage formula was struck down by the Supreme Court. 
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).  
 62. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439. 
 63. Id. § 2, at 437 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge 
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”). 
 64. See id. (preventing only discrimination that occurs “on account of race or color”). 
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Natives.65 In 1982, Congress amended Section 266 in response to a Court 
decision that limited Section 2 to claims of discriminatory intent.67  
At first, plaintiffs tackled vote denial in the “first generation” of 
voting rights claims.68 These claims covered blatant discrimination that 
denied or hindered ballot box access.69 Examples include poll taxes, 
grandfather clauses, and literacy tests. But, as with many forms of 
discrimination in the modern world, discrimination in the electoral 
process did not disappear; it moved underground. This made 
intentional discrimination standards harder to prove.70  
Later, plaintiffs turned their attention away from outright vote 
denial—many forms of which were outlawed by the VRA—to vote 
dilution, the “second generation” of voting rights claims, brought 
under the VRA. Vote dilution means to weaken the power of 
someone’s vote and typically describes the use of election systems to 
limit the ability “to translate [a group’s] strength into voting power.”71 
Vote dilution is actionable under amended Section 2 and the 
Constitution.72 Vote dilution claimants under Section 2 may challenge 
any election system that threatens that interest, whether from 
districting or election rules.73 For instance, minority communities have 
successfully challenged district drawing, called “cracking” and 
 
 65. Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 207, 89 Stat. 400, 402 
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3)).  
 66. See Voting Rights Act, Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301) (adopting a “results” test for Section 2, which looked 
to disparate effects rather than discriminatory intent). 
 67. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 2 (1982).  
 68. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting 
Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1498 (2008). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 71–72 (noting that Congress wanted an effects-based, rather than 
intent-based, test for Section 2 to ease the burden for claimants). 
 71. In re Senate Joint Resol. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 622 (Fla. 2012); 
see also Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 641 (1993) (describing vote dilution). 
 72. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 275–77. As Professor 
Travis Crum notes, the Court never decided whether vote dilution was actionable under the 
Fifteenth Amendment but did find it actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Court 
first held that dilution was unconstitutional in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–70 (1973). 
James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: 
Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22 (1982) 
(noting that vote dilution claims were an implication of the one-person-one-vote principle in 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964)). 
 73. See supra note 20 (examples of challenges to election and districting systems under 
Section 2).  
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“packing” of election districts.74 In cracking, voters are split up amongst 
multiple districts; in packing, they are concentrated in very few 
districts.75 The goal of both is to weaken the overall voting power of 
those cracked or packed.76  
Redistricting suits are those that seek to draw a new district as a 
remedy for cracking, packing, or other discriminatory practices. These 
claims often involve three types of election systems: single-member 
districts, multimember districts, and at-large systems.77 Voters in 
single-member districts elect one official for their jurisdiction, whereas 
those in multimember districts elect two or more officials for their 
district.78 Voters in at-large elections choose representatives to serve 
the entire political unit, such as a state, instead of a specified subset, 
such as a district.79 The entire constituency elects these officials.80 The 
most prominent at-large elections are for U.S. senators and the 
president, but they are also often seen at the city council level. At-large 
elections typically correlate with decreased minority representation.81 
 
 74. See infra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 
(2018) (describing cracking and packing). 
 75. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. at 1924. 
 76. See Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 269 (explaining how 
“politicians can predict that certain redistricting schemes—such as ‘packing’ or ‘cracking’ 
minority voters . . . will dilute minority voting strength”); see also N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP 
v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussing the powerful incentive of district drawing 
to dilute the voting strength of cohesive minority groups). 
 77. See infra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Frank Adams, Why Legislative Findings 
Can Pad-Lock Redistricting Plans in Racial-Gerrymandering Cases, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
1371, 1384 (2006) (discussing redistricting suits involving all three types of election systems).  
 78. 29 C.J.S. Elections § 82, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020). Multimember districts 
can create representation problems. Imagine three communities of roughly the same size that 
could each make their own single-member districts: A, B, and C. If all three are placed in a single 
district and given the ability to elect three representatives, and communities B and C vote 
together, B and C can elect all three representatives. 
 79. Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, “At-Large” Elections as Violation of § 2 of Voting Rights 
Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1973), 92 A.L.R. FED. 824, § 1(a) n.1 (1989).  
 80. See Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 1249, 1257 (1989) (calling at-large voting “[p]erhaps the preeminent form of vote dilution”). 
Additionally, all the seats in an election can be made at-large seats. See id. (“The majority, if it 
votes as a bloc, can choose all the officeholders, thereby denying a discrete minority an effective 
opportunity to elect any representatives of its choice.”). Alternatively, a jurisdiction can be 
separated geographically into single-district elections and then have one or two at-large seats 
covering the whole jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hart, et al., supra note 20 (discussing electoral systems 
of various Georgia counties).  
 81. See, e.g., David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers & Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of 
Latino Education: The Biases of At-Large Elections, 66 J. POL. 1224, 1241 (2004) (finding a 
correlation between at-large elections and Hispanic underrepresentation). As of 1965, 61 percent 
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In Georgia, thirty-four counties use at-large elections for all seats, 
while one hundred counties use at-large elections for at least one seat.82 
In 2013, 60 percent of voters in those at-large contests were White, as 
were 92 percent of those elected.83  
Plaintiffs typically pursue claims for redistricting under Section 2, 
not the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. As noted earlier, 
constitutional gerrymandering claims require a showing of intentional 
discrimination.84 Because districting lines are facially neutral, plaintiffs 
must show that “legitimate districting principles were ‘subordinated’ to 
race,” such that race was the predominant factor in legislative 
decisionmaking.85 Only then will courts apply strict scrutiny.86 By 
contrast, plaintiffs invoking Section 2 can challenge districting claims, 
such as cracking and packing, based on discriminatory effects, largely 
disassociated from evidence of discriminatory intent.87  
 
of cities with populations of over 5,000 used at-large elections for all of their representatives, INT’L 
CITY MANAGERS’ ASS’N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 118 (1965), and in 2013, that number was 
60 percent, INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 28 (2013). And, in 
1971, less than 1 percent of city council members were from minority groups (Black, Hispanic, 
Asian, or Native American), Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and 
Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, 43 
J. POL. 982, 982 (1981), whereas now roughly 10 percent are, INT’L CITY/CNTY. MGMT. ASS’N, 
2018 MUNICIPAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT SURVEY: SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 14 (2019).  
 82. Hart, et al., supra note 20.  
 83. Id. 
 84. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926–29 (2018) (discussing developing standards for 
constitutional challenges to politically gerrymandered districting lines); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
446 U.S. 55, 66–67 (1980) (“The Court explicitly indicated in Washington v. Davis that [the 
requirement of discriminatory intent] applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting 
just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination.”); Gilda R. Daniels, Racial Redistricting in 
a Post-Racial World, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 950–51, 951 n.21 (2011) (highlighting a 
legislature’s discriminatory intent as differentiating justiciable controversies from political 
questions). Racial gerrymandering claims can also be satisfied by “redistricting . . . so extremely 
irregular” that it must be race-based. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 646–47 (1993). In other 
words, intent is implied. 
 85. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958–59 (1996) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 
(1995)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 425–26 (2006) 
(discussing Gingles requirements, which do not include intent); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 
30, 34 (1986) (noting that the immediate case involved multimember districts). Districting claims 
can include single-member districts (for cracking and packing claims), multimember districts, and 
at-large elections. The Court first applied Section 2 to cracking claims in Growe v. Emison, 507 
U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993), and packing claims in Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993) 
(discussing a claim that plaintiffs were “packed into two districts”). Marylanders for Fair 
Representation, Inc. v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1044 (D. Md. 1994). The favored remedy for 
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In the early years after the VRA passed, the Court did not address 
whether vote dilution claims under Section 2 required proof of 
discriminatory intent or if disparate impact on representation would 
suffice.88 During this same period, lower federal courts had developed 
standards using a totality-of-the-circumstances test that looked to 
disparate effects on minority representation for constitutional claims 
of vote dilution—which the Court blessed in 1973 in White v. Regester.89 
However, the Court limited Section 2 in 1980 when it decided City of 
Mobile v. Bolden,90 a class action challenging the constitutionality of 
Mobile’s at-large election for city commissioners.91 The Court stated 
that Section 2 merely codified a cause of action coextensive with the 
Fifteenth Amendment.92 Because a Fifteenth Amendment claim 
requires intent to invalidate a facially neutral statute, so did a claim 
under the old Section 2.93 As a result, the Court threw out the plaintiff’s 
statutory and constitutional claims.94  
However, in 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to clarify that it 
applied to the discriminatory effects of vote dilution.95 Congress sought 
to undo the Court’s interpretation that stunted the sweep of Section 2 
 
parties challenging districting systems through Section 2 is to create a single-member district 
where the minority group constitutes a majority. Growe, 507 U.S. at 40. 
 88. There was a broader legal debate emerging during the Civil Rights Era of whether the 
Reconstruction Amendments protected citizens against governmental actions with discriminatory 
effects in addition to those with discriminatory intent. See Cheryl I. Harris, Limiting Equality: The 
Divergence and Convergence of Title VII and Equal Protection, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 101–
04 (noting that prior to Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), lower courts routinely applied 
disparate impact analysis to equal protection clause claims). This culminated in the Court holding 
that discriminatory intent was required for equal protection clause cases. Davis, 426 U.S. at 244–
45.  
 89. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–67 (1973) (affirming the district court’s invalidation 
of multimember voting districts based on discriminatory history and effects that the district court 
had identified and used); see, e.g., Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304–05 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(en banc) (applying the White test to a claim).  
 90. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 91. Id. at 58 (plurality opinion).  
 92. Id. at 60–61. At this point, the Court settled on the discriminatory intent standard for the 
Reconstruction Amendments. Id. at 62; see also Davis, 426 U.S. at 244–45 (concluding that 
“discriminatory racial purpose” is necessary to support an equal protection claim). 
 93. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60–62 (plurality opinion).  
 94. Id. at 61, 65. 
 95. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 40 (1982). Compare Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L. No. 89-110, 
§ 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (banning procedures used by “any State or political subdivision to deny or 
abridge the right . . . to vote on account of race or color”), with 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) 
(banning procedures employed “in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right . . . to vote on account of race or color” (emphasis added)). 
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because discriminatory effects perpetuate past discrimination, and  
election systems that “operate, designedly or otherwise, to minimize or 
cancel out the voting strength . . . of minority groups, are an 
impermissible denial of the right to have one’s vote fully count, just as 
much as outright denial of access to the ballot box.”96 Congress also 
wanted to assist plaintiffs by avoiding the difficulties with proving 
intent.97 As currently written, Section 2 declares that a violation occurs:  
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.98  
Although this statement on its face is quite simple, the text leaves 
little to guide judicial analysis. Because of the ambiguity of the phrase 
“totality of circumstances,” courts turned to the 1982 amendment 
Senate Report from the Senate Judiciary Committee for the factors in 
their totality of the circumstances analysis.99 The Senate Report 
mentions nine nonexhaustive factors, drawn primarily from White and 
the pre-Bolden caselaw.100 These factors include considerations of prior 
racial polarization in voting, “the extent of any history of official 
discrimination . . . that touched the right of the members of the 
minority group to register, to vote or to otherwise participate in the 
democratic process,” whether the political subdivision has used certain 
voting practices (antisingle shot provisions, large election districts, and 
so on) that tend to increase the likelihood for discrimination, and to 
what degree minority group members have been elected to public 
office.101 
 
 96. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28, 40–41. 
 97. Id. at 40. 
 98. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added).  
 99. E.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35–38, 36 n.4 (1986).  
 100. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (“While these enumerated factors will often be the most 
relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative of the alleged dilution.” (citation 
omitted)). The Court thought that this extratextual source was persuasive because these factors 
were drawn from caselaw, such as the totality-of-the-circumstances test created in White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and refined by lower courts, which the Court stated that Congress 
wanted to reinstate. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36 n.4 (tracing the factors to White and subsequent 
development by lower courts). 
 101. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (citation omitted). 
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The Court addressed the amended Section 2 in 1986 in Gingles.102 
After first observing that the 1982 amendment created a results-based 
test that effectively overruled Bolden via statute,103 it then crafted 
preconditions that must be fulfilled before courts apply the totality-of-
the-circumstances test (the nonexhaustive Senate factors referenced 
above).104 First, claimants must show that their community is 
“sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority 
in a single-member district.”105 Second, claimants must demonstrate 
that they are “politically cohesive,” in that they largely vote together.106 
Third, claimants must “demonstrate that the white majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”107 The point of the preconditions is to show that 
the election system actually dilutes a minority group’s voting power.108 
Thus, the vote dilution claims must meet two independent inquiries: 
(1) the three Gingles preconditions, and then (2) whether the totality-
of-the-circumstances (including the nonexhaustive Senate Report 
factors) demonstrate that the group “ha[s] less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to 
elect representatives of their choice.”109 Applying this analysis, the 
Gingles Court upheld all but one of the lower court’s findings of vote 
dilution.110 
As Professor Travis Crum puts it, “Gingles boils down to whether 
a minority group is residentially segregated and whether there is 
 
 102. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 30. 
 103. Id. at 35.  
 104. Id. at 48–50. The Senate Report noted three important limitations on Section 2. Id. at 46. 
First, no specific type of election system is a per se violation. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 16. Second, a 
dilutive device in the mere presence of “the lack of proportional representation” is not a violation. 
Id. Finally, the results test does not create a presumption of racial blocs, and the burden of proof 
remains on the plaintiffs. Id. at 34.  
 105. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50. 
 106. Id. at 51. 
 107. Id. (noting that this does not apply in unusual circumstances, such as when minority-
favored candidates run unopposed). 
 108. See id. at 47–51 (“[U]nless there is a conjunction of the [preconditions], the use of 
multimember districts generally will not impede the ability . . . to elect representatives . . . .”).  
 109. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2009) (plurality opinion). This order of 
operations for Gingles claims was made clear in Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), where 
it noted that Gingles factors were necessary but not sufficient to state a Section 2 claim. Id. at 
1011.  
 110. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80. 
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racially polarized voting.”111 In other words, the first precondition deals 
with segregation issues, while the second and third preconditions deal 
with polarized voting. These new inquiries left several ambiguities to 
be resolved later.112 Importantly for this Note, the Court then took aim 
at resolving what degree of segregation and polarized voting were 
necessary for a successful Section 2 claim.113  
II.  A DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE: THE LIMITATIONS OF 
BARTLETT V. STRICKLAND 
With a cause of action and a new test under Section 2, plaintiffs 
started to challenge the disparate impact of election policies again, this 
time with more innovative claims than the traditional, single-minority 
group claims. This Part first describes and outlines the features of two 
of these tools—crossover claims and aggregated claims—and how they 
work. Then, it outlines the background and rationales underlying the 
Bartlett decision, the case that held that crossover claims were not 
viable. Finally, it applies the four primary rationales to aggregated 
claims and finds that the Bartlett decision does not make those claims 
non-viable. 
A. Overview of Aggregated and Crossover Claims 
Although Gingles addressed claims brought by single-minority 
groups and accomplished a great deal of change, a further avenue for 
representation under Section 2 is the aggregated claim.114 As one 
 
 111. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 279. The Court split 
between Justice William Brennan’s plurality opinion and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
concurrence on whether causation was relevant to this latter issue of racially polarized voting, 
also known as racial bloc voting. Under Justice Brennan’s view, the reason why a minority 
community or majority bloc vote the way they do is irrelevant to Section 2. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 
63–64. Justice O’Connor believed causation did matter for liability. Id. at 100 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Justice Byron White’s concurrence cast confusion over which view 
prevailed, viewing the candidate’s race as relevant. Id. at 83 (White, J., concurring). 
 112. Soon after Gingles, which involved a multimember district claim, the Court extended 
Section 2 to cover single-member district claims, such as those alleging cracking and packing. 
Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993); see supra note 87; see also Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. 
Ct. 2305, 2330–31 (2018) (applying the Gingles test to a challenge to single-member districts drawn 
by the Texas Legislature).  
 113. Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 280–81.  
 114. See Chelsea J. Hopkins, The Minority Coalition’s Burden of Proof Under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623, 651–53 (2012) (describing ways that Section 2 
claims can be structured to ensure minority representation through aggregation).  
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scholar put it, “Much of the growth in [the number of Black elected 
officials] during the 1990s can be attributed to the [VRA].”115 However, 
the VRA did not cure the lack of representation in government, though 
it certainly helped. As a result, aggregated claims may be able to 
provide some relief in an increasingly diverse world, where structural 
factors and systemic racism will continue to affect both single and 
multiple-minority group communities. 
Aggregated and crossover claims both involve voter coalitions, 
but of different groups. An aggregated claim describes two or more 
minority groups that form a politically cohesive community that can 
meet the Gingles preconditions and the totality-of-the-circumstances 
test.116 The community must be cohesive and vote similarly—with a 
majority group voting as a bloc against it—to be viable. Bartlett added 
the requirement that the claimants will have to constitute a majority 
(50 percent or more) in a new single-member district.117 Thus, an 
aggregated claim could be brought by a group that, if successful, would 
make a new district that is 44 percent Hispanic and 21 percent Black.118 
Alternatively, a group of Black, Hispanic, and Asian voters could 
collectively constitute roughly 70 percent of a new district.119 By 
contrast, crossover claims by their nature fail Bartlett’s new 
requirement. In crossover claims, a minority community constitutes 
less than a majority within a redrawn district, but with majority 
“crossover” voters—those who vote for minority-preferred 
candidates—the minority community can effectively elect their 
preferred candidate. An example of a crossover claim might consist of 
a Black community, which could form 40 percent of a new district if 
drawn.120 That community would then need to demonstrate a reliable 
crossover voting effect from majority group members (such as 15 to 20 
 
 115. DAVID A. BOSITIS, JOINT CTR. FOR POL. & ECON. STUDIES, BLACK ELECTED 
OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 12 (2001).  
 116. Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two or 
More Minority Groups—When Is the Whole Greater than the Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 95, 111 (1989). 
 117. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 26 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 118. This example is from part of the remedy offered in Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 
1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988).  
 119. See DeBaca v. County of San Diego, 794 F. Supp. 990, 997 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (providing an 
example of a proposed district “in which African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans 
account[ed] for 73.84% of the total population”). 
 120. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 46–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the math related to 
crossover claims).  
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percent) in the new district that enabled it to elect its preferred 
candidate.121  
Prior to Bartlett, crossover claims did not fare well. Virtually every 
federal circuit court to encounter crossover claims viewed them as 
nonactionable under Section 2.122 By contrast, federal courts treated 
aggregated claims, still somewhat controversial, much more 
favorably.123 However, as this Note details in Part III, there is a 
continuing circuit split over the viability of these claims.124  
B. Bartlett: The End of Crossover Claims 
Because of the similarity of aggregated and crossover claims, the 
Bartlett Court’s prohibition of the latter introduces complications for 
the former. The Bartlett Court’s treatment of crossover claims, 
however, illuminates the differences between the two types of claims. 
This Section elaborates on those differences and highlights why 
aggregated claims are not precluded under Section 2. 
The controversy in Bartlett started with census redistricting in the 
state of North Carolina. In 2006, a three-judge panel in Wake County 
upheld the state’s redistricting plan passed by the North Carolina 
General Assembly in 2003 against a challenge alleging that the plan 
violated the North Carolina Constitution’s Whole County Provision 
(“WCP”).125 The WCP requires the legislature to draw state senate and 
house districts without dividing counties, unless in conflict with federal 
law.126 Based on census data, each North Carolina House district would 





 121. See id. As noted in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 
U.S. 399, 445 (2006), Section 2 does not require the creation of “influence” districts, where 
minority groups cannot elect their preferred candidate but can influence the outcome of an 
election.  
 122. See Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 649 S.E.2d 364, 372 (N.C. 2007) (summarizing circuit court 
decisions). 
 123. See infra Part III.  
 124. See infra Part III. 
 125. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366, 368. 
 126. Id. at 367; N.C. CONST. art. II, §§ 3(3), 5(3). 
 127. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366. 
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FIGURE 1. THE HOUSE REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR 2003, WITH A VIEW 




Aside from its obligation to redistrict under the census,129 the 
legislature was also concerned with Section 2, which it believed 
required the creation of crossover districts.130 Thus, the legislature 
created District 18 as a crossover district with a voting-age population 
 
 128. HOUSE REDISTRICTING PLAN, N.C. GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2003), https://www.ncleg.gov/
Files/GIS/Plans_Main/House_2003/mapSimple.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G57-EHSN] (map coloration, 
text color, and district line thickness altered to enhance viewability).  
 129. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
 130. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 374; see Stephenson v. Bartlett (Stephenson I), 562 S.E.2d 
377, 396–97 (N.C. 2002) (holding that the state legislature must draw districts in compliance with 
the VRA and not wait for litigation). 
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that was 39.36 percent Black.131 To create a district with this minority 
population, the legislature created three districts by splitting Pender 
County, with a population of 41,082, and combining it with its neighbor 
to the south, New Hanover County, with a population of 160,307.132 
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Wake County court, 
stating that federal law did not require crossover districts in the first 
instance because Section 2 did not allow crossover claims in after-
districting litigation.133 It relied on the fact that most federal circuit 
courts had rejected crossover claims because the minority did not 
constitute a majority in a redrawn district.134 Accordingly, the 
districting plan violated the North Carolina Constitution because it 
lacked federal justification for deviating from the WCP.135  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,136 and 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the plurality, which held that 
Section 2 does not authorize crossover claims.137 In rejecting crossover 
claims, the plurality clarified that the first Gingles precondition, 
originally phrased as requiring a “sufficiently large and contiguous” 
minority population “to constitute effective voting majorities in single-
member districts,” requires a community that will constitute a 
majority.138 In so holding, the plurality provided four rationales.139 First, 
crossover districts are inconsistent with the Gingles preconditions 
because the first precondition requires that the minority population 
constitute a majority within a new single-member district, and because 
the White voting bloc—an integral part of dilution—is breaking 
 
 131. Pender Cnty., 649 S.E.2d at 366–67. Courts generally use voting-age population 
(“VAP”), instead of general population. Id. at 370. Data showed a Black general population of 
41.54 percent, or VAP of 38.37 percent, was needed for a crossover district, and District 18 was 
42.89 percent Black with a 39.36 percent Black VAP. Id. at 367. 
 132. Id. at 366. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 372–74. 
 135. Id. at 375.  
 136. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 1 (2009) (plurality opinion).  
 137. Id. at 14. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia argued that Section 2 does not 
authorize any vote dilution claim, id. at 26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), while four 
dissenting Justices believed that crossover claims were viable under Section 2, id. at 26–27 (Souter, 
J., dissenting); id. at 44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Weinberg, 
supra note 30, at 427 n.123 (summarizing the arguments put forward by the Bartlett dissenters and 
other commentators in favor of recognizing crossover or aggregated claims under Section 2).  
 138. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15–20 (plurality opinion). 
 139. See id. at 14–23 (providing various arguments against crossover claims). 
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down.140 Although what “sufficiently large” meant under the first 
precondition had been somewhat unclear before, the plurality set a 
hard-and-fast rule that the minority community must make up at least 
50 percent in a new district.141 And the Gingles line of cases always 
framed the Section 2 inquiry as whether minority groups possess “the 
potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged 
structure.”142 In the plurality’s view, the minority’s choice is distinct 
from the choice of the coalition of minority and crossover voters.143 
Thus, “the potential to elect representatives” means the ability of the 
community to constitute a majority within a new single-member 
district.144  
Second, crossover claims were “contrary to the mandate of 
[Section] 2,” which only guarantees an “equal” opportunity to elect 
one’s representatives of choice and requires groups to pull political 
weight.145 The claimants were “no better or worse” in terms of their 
“opportunity to elect a candidate than . . . any other group of voters.”146 
Only if minorities could constitute a majority within their own single-
member district but were unable to elect a candidate would they have 
less opportunity.147 Minorities must do what all other voters do—argue, 
debate, and convince others to vote for their candidates.148 In other 
words, Section 2 does not guarantee heightened political strength by 
guaranteeing new districts based on purely political coalitions.149  
Third, increased racial considerations associated with crossover 
claims might run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.150 
Constitutional avoidance required an interpretation of Section 2 that 
avoids racial considerations, which are to be used only as a last resort.151 
 
 140. Id. at 15–16, 19–20.  
 141. Id. at 16–19. 
 142. Id. at 15 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 n.17 (1986)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17). 
 145. Id. at 14–15, 20. 
 146. Id. at 14. 
 147. Id. at 15.  
 148. Id.  
 149. See id. at 14–15 (“Nothing in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to 
form political coalitions.”). 
 150. Id. at 21.  
 151. Id. (“To the extent there is any doubt whether § 2 calls for the majority-minority rule, we 
resolve that doubt by avoiding serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”).  
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Mandating crossover districts would “unnecessarily infuse race into 
virtually every redistricting.”152 Thus, the plurality wanted to avoid the 
intensity and frequency of the racial considerations that crossover 
claims would introduce into the courts.153 But this does not preclude 
any accounting of race, which is tantamount to holding Section 2 
unconstitutional. And the plurality stated that “racial discrimination 
and racially polarized voting are not ancient history,” as work on issues 
of race “remains to be done.”154 This means that while racial 
considerations are not per se illicit in legislation, an interpretation that 
introduces too much racialization into the districting processes and 
subsequent litigation is probably off the table. Crossover districts 
crossed that line. 
Finally, while Section 2 ensures equal opportunity, crossover 
districts instead emphasize racial distinctions instead of progressing 
toward the “waning of racism.”155 Thus, permitting crossover claims 
means that Section 2 would require the cementing of certain 
developments of racial or ethnic solidarity, instead of the natural 
evolution of unity. Although the VRA was meant to encourage unity 
and solidarity, the plurality said the VRA was not meant to require this 
behavior “by force of law.”156  
C. Why Bartlett Is Not the End of Aggregated Claims 
Because of the Court’s analysis, however, and the relation 
between crossover claims and aggregated claims, many scholars 
thought that Bartlett foreclosed the latter claims completely.157 But not 
only are crossover claims distinguishable from aggregated claims for a 
 
 152. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 
548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). 
 153. See id. at 22 (“Disregarding the majority-minority rule and relying on a combination of 
race and party . . . would involve the law and courts in a perilous enterprise.”). 
 154. Id. at 25.  
 155. Id. (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)).  
 156. Id. at 25–26. 
 157. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Further, in 2012, the Court handed down Perry 
v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012), which contained the language, “If the District Court did set out to 
create a minority coalition district . . . it had no basis for doing so,” and cited to Bartlett with a 
“cf.” signal. Id. at 399. This alone does not evince an opinion as to the efficacy of aggregated 
claims, as it does not address the issue fully, and the dissenters in Bartlett signed onto the per 
curiam opinion. See Weinberg, supra note 30, at 430 (noting that “it is unlikely that the Perry 
Court intended to resolve whether Section 2 requires the creation of coalition districts in such a 
cryptic fashion”).  
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number of reasons, this Section argues that aggregated claims are 
largely consistent with the four primary rationales enumerated in 
Bartlett and that aggregated claims are still permitted under Section 2.  
1. Crossover Claims and Inconsistencies with Gingles.  In Bartlett, 
the plurality focused on how the first and third Gingles preconditions 
are at odds with crossover claims. Crossover districts by their very 
nature represent the result that the VRA was meant to foster—people 
work together despite their differences and minority groups have a 
“potential to elect” their desired representatives.158 By contrast, 
aggregated claims address the same worries regarding discrimination 
that motivated the passage of Section 2, but they involve more than 
one minority group. Aggregated claims also lack the bloc-breaking by 
the majority that is present in crossover claims. Although aggregated 
claims embody the falling of some barriers (between minority groups), 
the relevant barrier for the purpose of Section 2 is between the 
majority bloc and the minority communities.159 
Importantly, crossover districts fail the first Gingles 
precondition—meaning that the minority community does not 
constitute a majority within a single-member district if it must rely on 
crossover voters to elect its representatives.160 This is because, to the 
Bartlett plurality, the minority’s choice of representative is distinct 
from the choice of the coalition of the minority and crossover voters.161 
The crossover coalition then has the strength to elect representatives 
of the coalition’s choice, but the more entangled the minority group 
becomes with the majority, the less power the minority community has 
in its own right.162 By contrast, aggregated claimants can meet the 
majority requirement because the relevant community is composed of 
two or more minority groups, which assert that their preferences are 
being defeated by a majority voting bloc as the result of a 
discriminatory election system. Although both claims feature a type of 
 
 158. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14–16 (plurality opinion) (noting, for crossover claims, that 
majority voting blocs are breaking down and that there is evidence of increasing racial unity).  
 159. See id. at 16 (emphasizing that allowing crossover claims under Section 2 “would create 
serious tension with the third Gingles requirement that the majority votes as a bloc”). 
 160. If it could, the minority community would simply bring the claim on its own.  
 161. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 15 (plurality opinion) (“There is a difference between a racial 
minority group’s ‘own choice’ and the choice made by a coalition.”). 
 162. See id. at 16 (noting that, as crossover effects increase, the strength of majority bloc 
voting wanes, and as a result of crossover voting the direct power of the minority group 
unconnected from the coalitional power with crossover voters also will lessen)..  
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“coalition,” the third Gingles precondition highlights why these groups 
are different.  
Crossover claims also conflict with the third Gingles precondition 
because the White voting bloc, an integral part of the dilution of 
minority voting power, is breaking down.163 This factor is extremely 
important, because crossover voting most directly affects the racially 
polarized voting inquiry of Gingles (which is composed of the first two 
preconditions). The Court brought this tension up despite the fact that 
the parties stipulated that the third precondition had been met—showing 
just how important this was to the plurality.164 And, aggregated groups 
are the most clearly distinguishable on these grounds. Crossover voting 
by its nature represents a type of bloc breaking.165 The type of voting 
patterns alleged in viable aggregated claims do not show these types of 
bloc-breaking patterns. Indeed, aggregated communities, like single-
minority group communities, face similar opposition from a strong 
majority voting bloc. And, aggregated communities can show that their 
voting power is diluted, just like single-minority group communities 
can. This “serious tension” with the third Gingles precondition is what 
makes crossover claims, in the eyes of the Bartlett plurality, “political 
coalitions,” and this same logic means that aggregated claims are 
something else.166 
Further, aggregated claims align with the purposes of Gingles 
gatekeeping function—that the preconditions screen out claims that 
are not based in discrimination (or at least highly unlikely to be the 
result of discrimination). The Bartlett Court’s reasoning that crossover 
voters represent a “breaking down” of racial or ethnic barriers tracks 
with Justice John Paul Stevens’s views on affirmative action and 
inferring discrimination.167 Justice Stevens had a view of equal 
protection that lies in the vein of the antisubordination principle.168 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.; Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 281. 
 165. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (stating that “by definition,” crossover 
voting means that “white voters join in sufficient numbers with minority voters to elect the 
minority’s preferred candidate”). 
 166. Id. at 15–16.  
 167. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] decision by representatives of the majority to discriminate against the members of a 
minority race is fundamentally different from those same representatives’ decision to impose 
incidental costs on the majority . . . to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.”). 
 168. See id. at 247–48 & n.5 (“[A] decision by representatives of the majority to discriminate 
against the members of a minority race is fundamentally different from those same 
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Because it is rare, if at all, that a majority would harm its own race 
intentionally, Justice Stevens believed that legislation that benefited 
minority groups at the expense of the majority is likely not racial 
discrimination, or at the very least only benign discrimination.169 Why 
after all, would politicians attempt to subjugate a majority of their 
constituents?170 If this is true, the majority bloc’s actions—if also taken 
against crossover voters of the same race and ethnicity—are less likely 
to be discriminatory. More likely, these voters legitimately disagree 
with the coalition’s candidate.171 By contrast, in aggregated claims, the 
voters are racially or ethnically polarized, which supports the inference 
that this polarization reflects voting against minority interests.172 After 
all, Section 2 is a tool to measure oppression by a majority.173 And this 
emphasis on voting polarization makes sense because two of the three 
preconditions explicitly focus on polarization.174 These preconditions 
keep out claims that courts can assume will not (or should not) succeed 
in fulfilling the purposes of Section 2. But, because aggregated groups 
meet both the letter and logic of Gingles, courts should not bar 
aggregated claims.  
 
representatives’ decision to impose incidental costs on the majority of their constitutes in order 
to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.”). 
 169. Id.; see also Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (implying that there may be less 
racially polarized voting because many crossover voters, who are defecting from the majority 
voting bloc, are voting for minority voter interests). 
 170. Justice Stevens’ view on antisubordination can be seen particularly clearly in his sparring 
with Justice Thomas in Adarand, 
I would not find Justice THOMAS’ extreme proposition—that there is a moral and 
constitutional equivalence between an attempt to subjugate and an attempt to redress 
the effects of a caste system—at all persuasive. It is one thing to question the wisdom 
of affirmative-action programs . . . . It is another thing altogether to equate the many 
well-meaning and intelligent lawmakers and their constituents—whether members of 
majority or minority races—who have supported affirmative action over the years, to 
segregationists and bigots. 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 171. The underlying reasons for polarized voting are irrelevant. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30, 67, 70–71 (1986) (rejecting the requirement “that the discriminatory intent of individual 
white voters must be proved in order to make out a § 2 claim”).  
 172. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] decision by 
representatives of the majority to discriminate against the members of a minority race is 
fundamentally different from those same representatives’ decision to impose incidental costs on 
the majority of their constituents in order to provide a benefit to a disadvantaged minority.”).  
 173. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43–44 (noting that in order to determine a violation of § 2 “a 
court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral 
opportunities”).  
 174. The second Gingles precondition considers the cohesiveness of the minority community, 
and the third precondition reviews the presence of a strong majority voting bloc. Id. at 51.  
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Moreover, the requirement that minorities make up a majority 
within a redrawn district is partially the result of administrability and 
judicial resource concerns.175 Crossover claims do not implicate this 
interest because they suggest the existence of racial or ethnic unity that 
Section 2 was designed to foster, without the assistance of the courts.176 
Thus, it is more efficient to let those claims go and focus scarce judicial 
resources on those that more strongly implicate the antidiscrimination 
purpose of Section 2. In Bartlett, District 18’s Black voting-age 
population would have fallen from 39.36 percent to 35.33 percent had 
Pender County stayed whole.177 This minimal change, paired with 
significant crossover voting, likely did not justify an application of 
Section 2, though the Court did not explicitly state this. Additionally, 
this bright-line rule makes judicial administration easier by avoiding 
the measurement of an unknown variable of crossover voting.178 The 
same is not true in aggregated claims. Aggregated claims can meet the 
Gingles preconditions and maintain the Court’s bright-line rules.179 For 
example, an aggregated claim could be composed of a group of 60 
percent Black voters and 40 percent Hispanic voters, who make up 
over 50 percent of the voting population in a newly drawn single-
member district, suffer from a history of majority bloc voting, and vote 
cohesively together, thus satisfying the Gingles preconditions. And 
aggregated claims represent voting polarization and discrimination 
similar to single-minority group claims and are therefore worthy of the 
same protection. 
2. The New Section 2 Mandate: Limits on Political, not Permissible, 
Coalitions.  In addition to concerns about the Gingles framework, the 
Bartlett Court also moved to limit the “mandate” of Section 2.180 The 
Court originally interpreted the mandate as broad, flexibly prohibiting 
 
 175. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 17 (2009) (plurality opinion) (“We find support for the 
majority-minority requirement in the need for workable standards and sound judicial and 
legislative administration . . . . The same cannot be said of a less exacting standard that would 
mandate crossover districts under § 2.”).  
 176. Id. at 25.  
 177. Id. at 8. 
 178. Id. at 17. 
 179. Id. at 14; Ho, supra note 29, at 432.  
 180. See Drecun, supra note 30, at 125–26 (“That Justice Kennedy perceived [the state 
officials’] decision to pursue [the retention of the minority group’s voting strength] as contrary to 
the law’s mandate is a measure of how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VRA has 
changed across time.”).  
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all election systems that “operate to minimize or cancel out the voting 
strength of [minorities in] the voting population.”181 The Court 
attacked vote dilution that was effectuated through discriminatory 
districting schemes by first prohibiting multimember districts, then 
expanding it to single-member districts, and extending Section 2’s 
coverage to judicial elections.182 Lower courts have also expansively 
read the VRA to target voter identification laws, restrictive 
registration processes, and inequitable access to polling places.183 By 
contrast, the Bartlett plurality stated that preserving minority gains in 
districting ran contrary to the mandate of Section 2, because the VRA 
was not meant to hand out political advantages.184 It is a protection 
from “political famine,” not a guarantee of “a political feast.”185 
Applying this logic, crossover claims fare no better or worse than other 
political groups trying to elect their candidate by forming coalitions.186 
Thus, the Court saw Section 2 as creating a distinction between 
political coalitions and permissible coalitions. However, both the 
limiting principle of Bartlett and the nature of crossover claims counsel 
against labeling aggregated claims as merely political coalitions.  
Although the plurality did not want lower courts to entangle 
themselves in politics, the Court did not preclude single-minority group 
claims, meaning these groups do not impermissibly introduce political 
 
 181. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47–48 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting Burns 
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)). In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the 
Court focused heavily on Congress’s purpose to tackle “insidious and pervasive evil,” filled with 
“obstructionist tactics” that had reared their head in “unremitting and ingenious defiance.” Id. at 
309, 328; Drecun, supra note 30, at 125. 
 182. Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–42 (1993) (applying Section 2 to single-member district 
“cracking” claims); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993) (single-member district 
“packing” claims); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (judicial elections). As the Fourth 
Circuit noted, expansions outside of vote dilution have been rare, primarily due to Section 4(b) 
and 5’s preclearance scheme that was struck down in Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 
(2013). See League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 239 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he predominance of vote dilution in Section 2 jurisprudence likely stems from the 
effectiveness of the now-defunct Section 5 preclearance requirements that stopped would-be vote 
denial from occurring in covered jurisdictions like large parts of North Carolina.”). 
 183. League of Women Voters of N.C., 769 F.3d at 239, 244–45 (giving examples of where 
Section 2 had been used to target vote denial, and then applying Section 2 to a law eliminating 
same-day voter registration and out-of-precinct voting).  
 184. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14–15, 20, 25–26 (plurality opinion) (noting that Section 2 was 
not meant to require “by force of law” the racial and ethnic unity that it was meant to inspire).  
 185. Id. at 16.  
 186. Id. at 14.  
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considerations into lower courts’ analysis.187 This is the limiting 
principle of Bartlett. And even for single-minority group claims, some 
political tie and analysis are necessary to show a lack of opportunity for 
representation. Indeed, the second Gingles precondition is that the 
relevant community is politically cohesive enough. Thus, mere 
consideration of politics should not automatically bar aggregated 
claims. And from the standpoint of political entanglement of different 
coalitions, it seems difficult to distinguish a coalition from a single-
minority group and a coalition formed from members of two or more 
minority groups.  
Additionally, aggregated claims are also distinct in appearance 
from crossover claims. First, crossover voting resembles general, 
nonracialized political activity: groups bonding over a political goal.188 
Again, (usually White) crossover voters are not part of the claim and 
do not purport to be direct victims of discrimination on the basis of 
minority status.189 By contrast, aggregated claimants can and do allege 
such discrimination. And while aggregated claims result from a 
merging of groups, these are two minority groups—the type of groups 
that Section 2 protects from unlawful barriers in voting. At its core, the 
aggregated community’s tie is one of common discrimination, not 
common politics.  
More importantly, perhaps, crossover claims have no limiting 
principle. What percentage of a single-member district should be able 
to sustain a crossover claim? In Bartlett, minorities constituted roughly 
36 percent of the redrawn district. What about 25 percent? 10 percent? 
Even Justice David Souter in his dissent said that as time goes on, the 
size of the minority in the new single-member district will decrease 
because crossover voters will increase as voting blocs break down.190 
Eventually, these voting patterns start to look like political actors 
working together. However, once crossover claims are barred—where 
 
 187. See id. at 17 (noting that crossover claims require courts to engage in political inquiries 
ill-suited for the judiciary).  
 188. See id. at 14–15 (“Recognizing a [Section] 2 claim in this circumstance would grant 
minority voters ‘a right to preserve their strength for the purposes of forging an advantageous 
political alliance.’”). 
 189. Although it is true that crossover voters are indirectly affected by discriminatory 
behavior, this incidental discrimination that they suffer is exactly the kind of injury the Bartlett 
Court wanted to prevent redress for. See id. at 15–16 (noting that the crossover voters suffer from 
political injury, as opposed to one that is cognizable under Section 2).  
 190. Id. at 33 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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the likely uniting factor is political—application of the Gingles 
preconditions and totality-of-the-circumstances test ensures that 
Section 2 vindicates claims that combat discriminatory effects, not 
claims that represent political association.  
Finally, the suggestive language about opportunities of minority 
voters in Bartlett is misleading. Indeed, aggregated communities could 
represent the result of an “opportunity to join other voters—including 
other racial minorities, or whites, or both—to reach a majority.”191 But 
the Court’s point is that in crossover claims, minority groups can join 
with other groups to elect their representatives without Section 2.192 At 
any rate, this concern mirrors the Court’s concerns about the breaking 
down of bloc voting.193 By contrast, when an aggregated community 
meets the Gingles preconditions, including a showing of minority 
cohesion and electoral losses because of a majority voting bloc, barriers 
in the electoral process prevent its members from joining with others 
to achieve electoral success.194 The mere ability to join in coalitions 
with others is not enough, and it was never enough under Section 2. 
Because aggregated claims embody protection against “political 
famine,” while not representing the “political feast” of crossover 
claims, the political considerations argument applies with less force.195  
3. Crossover Coalitions Create Unnecessary Infusions of Race.  The 
political considerations in Bartlett were arguably overshadowed by the 
concerns over racial considerations being injected into the judicial 
process.196 Mere considerations of race, however, cannot explain the 
 
 191. Id. at 14 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see Weinberg, supra note 30, at 426 
(noting how minorities joining together would form “political coalitions” in the Bartlett Court’s 
view).  
 192. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that Black voters “standing 
alone have no better or worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of 
voters”).  
 193. See id. at 16 (noting the tension with the focus of Gingles on racial bloc voting where 
White crossover voters are the reason why minority voters could win). See supra Part II.B.i for a 
response.  
 194. See Drecun, supra note 30, at 131 (arguing that electoral barriers for minority voters are 
linked to their minority status).  
 195. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16–17 (plurality opinion) (noting that crossover claims represent 
a political feast because they allow heightened protection for political coalitions). 
 196. Though not every Section 2 case involves questions exclusively about race, such as where 
ethnic minorities are involved, the Court generally treats ethnic discrimination the same as racial 
discrimination for equal protection purposes. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 
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result in Bartlett because this would mean the end of all Section 2 
claims. Even single-minority group claims can account for racial 
percentages, racial divisions in voting, and histories of racial 
discrimination.197 However, the frequency and intensity of racial 
considerations were concerns made apparent from the statement that 
crossover claims would “unnecessarily infuse race into virtually every 
redistricting.”198 The term “unnecessarily” implies an intensity 
problem. And the phrase “virtually every” poses a frequency problem. 
But neither dooms aggregated claims.  
As for frequency, crossover districts are ostensibly more likely to 
occur than aggregated districts. This is because crossover claims allow 
a minority group to constitute less than a majority within a redrawn 
district and still succeed on a Section 2 claim. In a White-majority 
nation, there are always enough White voters to find. Even in diverse 
states, one can find White and minority populations sufficient to 
plausibly form crossover claims more often than one can find two 
different minority populations able to support aggregated claims. For 
instance, in North Carolina, the number of potential crossover 
districts—with White voters and either Hispanic or Black voters—that 
can be drawn within each county based on census data is higher than 
the potential number of aggregated districts with Black–Hispanic 
aggregated communities.199 Though this example has limited 
 
267, 273 (1986) (“Decisions by faculties and administrators of public schools based on race or 
ethnic origin are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 197. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36–37, 51 (1986). For a discussion of the historical 
evidence regarding the original understanding of race and the Fifteenth Amendment, see Crum, 
Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 305–11. Needless to say, new swaths of 
empowered Black voters during Reconstruction garnered the political victories necessary to pass 
the Fifteenth Amendment, and much of this history seems at odds with some of the modern views 
on colorblindness as a constitutional requirement. But, given the trend of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, scholars need to grapple with the fact that colorblindness, even if historically 
flawed, is not going anywhere. Thus, any theory of aggregated claims will have to fit within 
Bartlett’s framework for the VRA and Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.  
 198. Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added) (plurality opinion). 
 199. See generally NORTH CAROLINA 2010 SUMMARY, supra note 19 (summarizing 2010 
census data for North Carolina counties by race). This illustration of hypothetical claims in North 
Carolina relied on the census data for populations of North Carolina counties. Using this, this 
Note determined, within each county, how many North Carolina General Assembly House 
crossover or aggregated districts could theoretically be created from population sizes as of 2010, 
assuming that each House district has a population of roughly 75,000. Assuming crossover voting 
is effective with a minority population of 35 percent of a new district, each crossover district would 
need to have 26,250 minorities (either Black or Hispanic voters). Aggregated districts would 
require a minority community (Black and Hispanic voters) with at least 37,500 individuals, or 50 
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explanatory power, it supports the intuition that crossover claims are 
more likely to occur than aggregated claims.200 
Second, the assumption that because multiple races are involved, 
aggregated claims feature a heightened intensity of racial 
considerations is dubious for several reasons. First, aggregation results 
in less hairsplitting over race than crossover claims.201 Crossover claims 
involve the precise measure of a constantly fluctuating variable of 
crossover voting, which requires courts to engage in a panoply of race-
based assumptions.202 This added question—how many crossover 
voters there are—is the key distinction.203 The questions that 
aggregated claims raise are not as problematic: Are the claimants 
minorities, and do the claimant communities meet the Section 2 
requirements? For aggregated claims, there is no endless list of factors 
that makes a person a certain race or language minority, even if 
cohesiveness and geographic compactness of the relevant community 
may change the outcome of litigation.  
Further, disallowing aggregation creates more racial 
considerations.204 If required to gatekeep all aggregated claims, courts 
will account more for race205—not less—out of the need to classify 
claimants based on their races or ethnicities to determine their 
eligibility for a remedy.206 This contradicts the Court’s understanding 
 
percent of the new district. As a result, potential crossover districts are more possible, with fifty-
four potential crossovers districts as opposed to forty potential aggregated districts. Still, this 
illustration is limited and does not inquire into whether these groups are of voting age or meet 
the Gingles preconditions. And it forecloses cross-county districts, though the intracounty analysis 
makes some sense because of the WCP. 
 200. The fact that fewer circuits have addressed aggregated claims than crossover claims also 
provides support for this claim. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion) (noting that the 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits declined to allow crossover claims); infra 
notes 236–36 and accompanying text (noting that only the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have squarely addressed aggregated claims).  
 201. Ho, supra note 29, at 432–33. 
 202. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 17, 22–23 (plurality opinion) (emphasizing that crossover claims 
require courts to both ask questions “that even experienced polling analysts and political experts” 
cannot answer, and make race-based assumptions about voting patterns).  
 203. See id. at 17, 21–22 (describing the question of crossover voting as a “racial measure” 
that should be avoided).  
 204. See Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1399 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Keith, J., 
dissenting) (“The majority, today, segregates the Black and Hispanic beneficiaries of Voting 
Rights Act protection solely on the basis of race.”).  
 205. See id.  
 206. Id.; see also Ben Boris, Note, The VRA at a Crossroads: The Ability of Section 2 To 
Address Discriminatory Districting on the Eve of the 2020 Census, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093, 
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of the Reconstruction Amendments as barring all but necessary 
considerations of race.207 Moreover, this belies the Bartlett plurality’s 
understanding of “unnecessary” racial considerations. The existence of 
crossover voting means that a significant portion of majority voters are 
comfortable with increasing diversity and, therefore, that Section 2 is 
unneeded. By contrast, an aggregated community’s voting power in a 
successful claim is diluted due to minority status by a majority voting 
bloc.  
Further, in support of their view that aggregated claims are 
unwise, scholars like Professor Abigail Thernstrom believe that 
aggregation and all majority-minority redistricting treat minorities as 
fungible—that these voters all have the same views, interests, and are 
simply interchangeable (and that minority candidates are unable to 
compete in today’s modern pluralistic elective world).208 Such 
treatment also ostensibly violates the Court’s command not to assume 
that all minorities think alike.209 However, contrary to Thernstrom’s 
view, aggregation showcases a better understanding of racial 
complexities. Thernstrom’s conclusion results in treating people only 
as their race. In other words, courts denying aggregation essentially say 
that a minority’s views inhere with their race or ethnicity and that these 
views are fundamentally divergent.210 This is also a race-based 
 
2111 (2020) (“Under the logic of the Nixon majority, a plaintiff class would have to be racially 
‘pure.’ This would prove increasingly unworkable in light of the demographic changes mentioned 
above.”). 
 207. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (noting that laws classifying citizens on 
the basis of race are presumptively unconstitutional).  
 208. Abigail Thernstrom, Redistricting in Today’s Shifting Racial Landscape, 23 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 373, 383, 400–02 (2012) (“[I]n much civil rights literature, it was assumed that 
members of minority groups were fungible—that all non-White Americans had the same 
interests.”); see also Geraci, supra note 29, at 407 (stating that multiracial coalitions risk “treating 
[minority group members] as fungible commodities”). But see Hopkins, supra note 114, at 645 
(noting that cohesion testing can alleviate some issues of treating minorities as fungible). Still, 
most circuits hold that a minority-preferred candidate need not be of the minority community’s 
race or ethnicity. See ELLEN KATZ, VOTING RTS. INITIATIVE, DOCUMENTING DISCRIMINATION 
IN VOTING: JUDICIAL FINDINGS UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT SINCE 1982 at 
64 n.139, 65 n.141 (2005) (collecting caselaw). Thus, the issue is not so much an assumption of 
whether minority candidates can compete in a White-majority district contest (in a nation fast-
moving demographically anyway), but whether minority communities can effectively achieve 
representation and policy goals, in a nation with a representative democracy where voting power 
is supposed to be relatively equal. 
 209. Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12. 
 210. Drecun, supra note 30, at 137. 
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assumption of the type that the Bartlett plurality wanted to minimize.211 
However, this is not to say that aggregation has no risks. It does. But 
that is precisely why the preconditions and a totality-of-the-
circumstances test exist—to see where discrimination, not merely 
political coalition building, is taking place. That, after all, is the heart 
of Bartlett. Forbidding aggregation, in some part, denies that minorities 
can think outside the bounds of their race, ethnicity, or culture.212  
Likewise, Thernstrom’s view assumes that minorities are discrete, 
incapable of allying with other minority groups and sharing a common 
or parallel history of discrimination.213 However, as one author notes, 
congressional intent inherently aggregates certain groups together—
most clearly seen in the case of language minorities under Section 2.214 
And to think that Chinese, Japanese, Thai, Filipino and Asian Indian 
Americans can be aggregated as language minorities implicitly assumes 
enough potential similarity—likely in the form of common 
discrimination—to aggregate.215 Why not all groups, then, who are 
often “othered” and treated as the same, or discriminated against 
collectively by White majorities? And this argument undercuts the 
assertion that aggregation impermissibly treats minority groups as 
interchangeable. Arguably, if large portions (though obviously not all) 
minorities share common views because of a history of similar 
discrimination, it is hard to see how aggregation makes them fungible. 
Their views are not performative or linked to their race for race’s sake, 
but the product of a long and storied history of oppression. 
Aggregation thus promotes views and the representation of those 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
 211. See Miller, 515 U.S. at 911–12 (noting the offensive assumption, in race-based districting, 
that minorities “think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls”).  
 212. See Boris, supra note 206, at 2110–11 (“Under the logic of the Nixon majority, a plaintiff 
class would have to be racially ‘pure.’”); Drecun, supra note 30, at 137 (“To bar [aggregated] 
claims categorically . . . would hold that racial identification signifies immutable differences 
between minority groups.”). 
 213. Common histories of discrimination may not be necessary—indeed it may be enough to 
show that they are discriminated against together, even if in different ways. Drecun, supra note 
30, at 136; Schulte, supra note 29, at 472–75. In either scenario, discrimination operates invidiously 
against both groups concurrently, even if in invariable and indiscriminate ways, precisely the type 
of evasive and indeterminate inequity the VRA is aimed to stop.  
 214. Sette, supra note 29, at 2728. 
 215. See 52 U.S.C. § 10503(e) (2018) (defining “language minority group” as “persons who 
are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage”).  
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On balance, treating minorities as demarcated boxes is worse than 
allowing a small amount of fungibility in aggregation.216 Section 2 
already allows some fungibility within the single-minority group claims 
because minority voters who vote the same way are interchangeable in 
the analysis.217 If one takes the view that fungibility is a deadly problem, 
then one might have to undo Section 2 altogether. Further, Gingles 
assists with the fungibility point—because voters must be cohesive and 
face a majority voting bloc. And the totality-of-the-circumstances test 
relies heavily on evidence of implicit or explicit discrimination. These 
will likely help courts root out invidious discrimination, even if it faces 
two or more groups. And doctrinally, while Gingles’ political cohesion 
requirement makes voters within each minority group fungible if they 
vote cohesively, it does not tell courts to separate these groups 
arbitrarily—that is, to forbid aggregation.218  
Moreover, America’s increasingly pluralistic nature shows that 
disallowing aggregation would undermine the use of Section 2 as an 
important tool to eradicate voting discrimination because “racial 
discrimination and racially polarized voting are not ancient history.”219 
Racism in election systems will be able to not just survive but thrive as 
diversity increases, because the eroding majority can dilute minority 
voting power as long as it happens against multiple minority groups.220 
The growing diversity of our nation will thus make it easier to hide 
discriminatory districting, if aggregated claims are not permitted. And 
the opposition to aggregation has no answer for how to address 
biraciality and biethnicity.221 Are these people classified as the group 
they primarily identify with, or are they given no remedy at all? Courts 
addressing one or more communities with biracial or biethnic members 
face the task of either considering difficult racial and ethnic 
complexities or unconstitutionally denying rights based on race or 
ethnicity. Disallowing this is another form of essentialism—the 
assumption that all members in a group will act or think in a given way. 
 
 216. Ho, supra note 29, at 432–33.  
 217. See id. at 433 (“But such concerns . . . are also present in § 2 claims brought on behalf of 
voters from a single minority group.”). 
 218. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1399 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Keith, J., dissenting).  
 219. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality opinion).  
 220. Moreover, aggregation embodies a more realistic view of race. Communities will often 
be discriminated against as a whole rather than simply their Black, Asian, or Hispanic portions.  
 221. See Boris, supra note 206, at 2110–11 (illustrating the problems with classifying voters of 
mixed-race or mixed-ethnicity backgrounds). 
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As one student scholar notes, trying to determine racial “purity” sets 
courts down a dark path.222 Although the crossover claims in Bartlett 
implicated an offensive assumption about minority group members, 
prohibiting aggregation implies two offensive assumptions: that 
minority group members all think alike within their groups, and that 
minority groups are perfectly separable.223  
Admittedly, significant racial and political considerations can be 
problematic, but some must be allowed because single-minority group 
claims involve both.224 Crossover claims necessarily entail more 
considerations of race and politics than single-minority group claims.225 
However, aggregated claims do not necessarily require courts to 
become as deeply entangled in racial and political considerations as 
crossover claims require. At some level, the allowable amount of race 
and politics is a judgment call. Aggregated claims may involve more 
political considerations than single-minority group claims but have 
similarly significant racial considerations.226 More importantly, 
aggregated claims do not implicate many of the racial and political 
problems that plague crossover claims, because aggregated claimants 
do not look outside of the community claiming discrimination for the 
success of their claim. Thus, aggregated claims are not foreclosed by 
this argument in Bartlett. 
4. The Capture of Natural or Organic Racial Progress.  Finally, the 
Bartlett plurality stressed how Section 2 ensures equal opportunity to 
elect one’s representatives, but crossover districts suggest that this 
opportunity already exists.227 While the Court admired the legislature’s 
creation of crossover districts that capitalized on racial unity, the 
plurality stated that Section 2 is not meant to preserve every instance 
 
 222. Id. at 2111. 
 223. See supra notes 211–11 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 22 (plurality opinion) (“Disregarding the majority-minority rule 
and relying on a combination of race and party to presume an effective majority would 
involve . . . a perilous enterprise.”). 
 225. See id. at 14–15, 21 (noting the racial and political considerations associated with 
crossover claims). 
 226. For example, the court could simply look to the presence of a minority group, without 
engaging in hairsplitting over its composition, and proceed with standard Gingles analysis. 
 227. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion) (“But because they form only 39 percent 
of the voting-age population in District 18, African-Americans standing alone have no better or 
worse opportunity to elect a candidate than does any other group of voters with the same relative 
voting strength.”).  
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of majority–minority unity where it exists.228 In other words, some 
developments of unity and progress in the community are organic or 
natural, and the VRA is not meant to capture these. Instead, the VRA 
is supposed to be used where growth and unity are absent.  
This argument by the Bartlett Court provides a sharp distinction 
between aggregated and crossover claims. First, aggregated claims do 
not represent growth toward unity the way that crossover claims do. 
They do not feature White voters crossing racial lines in a way that 
would make the claims nonactionable under Section 2, as the Bartlett 
Court sees it.229 Instead, aggregated claims reflect harsh racial divisions 
in voting between minority groups and the majority. Assuming Gingles 
is met, this means that the majority and minority groups vote as blocs—
with the majority nearly always winning out. In crossover claims, the 
precise opposite is happening—the majority bloc is breaking down. If 
more majority voters join them, the minority groups can win.230 Second, 
under the plurality’s view, Section 2’s enforcement rules can be 
analogized to the rules that a referee would employ. Generally, courts 
let the political process continue unless someone commits a foul.231 
Crossover districts embody the game being played fairly, but dilution 
of a minority group’s voting power by a strong majority bloc is a foul. 
Aggregated claims again look more like single-minority group claims 
than crossover claims. In both single-minority group and aggregated 
claims, bloc voting is preventing minority preferences from being 
elected, and the groups are strongly segregated. By contrast, the 
Bartlett Court’s 50 percent threshold rule implies that in crossover 
claims, segregation is likely “waning.”232 Third, unlike crossover claims, 
aggregated claims represent the entrenchment of racially based voting 
and districting, not their diminishing.233 As Professor Sheryll Cashin 
predicts, racism will likely get worse as America becomes increasingly 
pluralistic, and only once society moves past the majority–minority 
 
 228. See id. at 15 (“Section 2 does not impose on those who draw election districts a duty to 
give minority voters the most potential, or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting 
crossover voters.”).  
 229. Id. at 14.  
 230. See id. at 24 (noting the tension with the third Gingles precondition). 
 231. This is in line with the United States v. Carolene Products Co. view of the Constitution, 
where courts use more exacting scrutiny when the political processes are turned against “discrete 
and insular minorities.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 232. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16–17 (plurality opinion) (noting the tension with the first Gingles 
precondition). 
 233. See id. at 25 (characterizing crossover voting as the “waning” of racial voting).  
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threshold will the nation be able to begin to heal.234 Thus, aggregated 
claims are properly viewed as distinguishable from crossover claims.  
III.  AGGREGATED CLAIMS UNDER THE TEXT OF SECTION 2 
Though distinguishable, the mere fact that aggregated claims may 
not be foreclosed by prior rationales leaves quite a bit to be desired. 
This Part sates that desire. To do so, it advances a novel statutory 
argument, built on the text of Section 2, that aggregated claims are 
permissible. It first details the arguments featured in the relevant 
circuit splits, focusing on the Sixth Circuit’s analysis of the issue. Then, 
this Part asserts that the singular–plural canon of interpretation can 
help legal readers parse the text in a meaningful way—and one which 
confirms that aggregated claims are indeed permissible.  
A. A Circuit Split Emerges: Aggregated Claims in the Lower Courts 
The question of whether Section 2 allowed aggregated claims 
resulted in a circuit split starting in the mid-1990s.235 This split resulted 
from a sharp textual debate interpreting the phrase “a class of citizens” 
in Section 2. Earlier courts used the remedial nature of the VRA, 
without much textual analysis, to allow such claims.236 In contrast, later 
 
 234. SHERYLL CASHIN, LOVING: INTERRACIAL INTIMACY IN AMERICA AND THE THREAT TO 
WHITE SUPREMACY 173–75 (2017); see also SHERYLL CASHIN, INTEGRATION AS A MEANS OF 
RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND OPPORTUNITY 75 (2017), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/
files/A_Shared_Future_Chapter_2_Integration_Restoring_Democracy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6L9-
783Y] (noting that not only will White “cultural dexterity” be necessary, but that mobilization and 
coalition building to encourage public policies of inclusion and integration will also be necessary). 
 235. See infra notes 236–36. 
 236. The Fifth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit explicitly allowed such claims. See Concerned 
Citizens of Hardee Cnty. v. Hardee Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(allowing such claims); Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988) (same). 
The Second and Ninth Circuits implicitly allowed aggregated claims to proceed. See Bridgeport 
Coal. For Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 274–77 (2d Cir.), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 512 U.S. 1283 (1994) (applying Gingles preconditions to a claim 
without directly deciding the propriety of aggregated claims); Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 
884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); see also Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (2d Cir. 
2012) (dismissing on other grounds, likely meaning Bridgeport Coalition is still good law). 
The First and Seventh Circuits avoided the question. See Frank v. Forest Cnty., 336 F.3d 
570, 575 (7th Cir. 2003) (calling aggregation “problematic”); Latino Pol. Action Comm., Inc. v. 
City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 1986) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim because they 
failed to establish racial polarization). This allowed district courts in those circuits to address the 
question, and the District of Massachusetts held that aggregated claims could survive summary 
judgment. Huot v. City of Lowell, 280 F. Supp. 3d 228, 235–37 (D. Mass. 2017); see also Baldus v. 
Members of Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd., 849 F. Supp. 2d 840, 857 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (addressing 
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courts saw Section 2’s text as sufficiently plain to prohibit aggregated 
claims—or implied as much, though some dissents argued that the 
combination of textual ambiguity and the VRA’s open-ended and 
broad remedial nature should control interpretation.237  
The first circuit to consider aggregation—the Fifth Circuit in 
Campos v. City of Baytown238—exemplified the early remedial 
approach. The Fifth Circuit held that nothing in Section 2 prevented 
aggregation, and that aggregation was supported by the congressional 
attempts to remedy discrimination facing both groups that was 
“pervasive and national in scope.”239 Further, the VRA protects both 
language and racial minorities, and thus these voters could be 
considered collectively if they “cross the Gingles threshold as 
potentially disadvantaged voters” and “actually vote together.”240 In 
the claim, the Black and Hispanic populations in Baytown, Texas 
challenged the at-large election system for the city’s six council 
members.241 The district court found that the aggregated community 
was geographically compact enough to constitute a majority within a 
redrawn district, the community was politically cohesive, and the 
majority voting bloc consistently voted against minority candidates.242 
The district court then determined that the totality of the 
 
a potential aggregated claim and noting that evidence of a successful minority coalition would 
support finding “no Section 2 violation”). The Huot court held that the First Circuit’s pre-Gingles 
case denied an aggregated claim because of a lack of cohesion, and thus was not controlling as to 
whether aggregation was permissible. Huot, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 236. 
 237. The Sixth Circuit explicitly prohibits such claims. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1392 
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Fourth Circuit called aggregated claims into serious question. See 
Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 430–31 (4th Cir. 2004) (disallowing crossover claim by stating that 
minorities should not be able to numerically join with “other members of the electorate” under 
Section 2). 
 238. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 239. Id. at 1244. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 1241–42. Together, those communities constituted 25.4 percent of the city. Id. at 
1241. 
 242. Id. at 1242; see also id. at 1248–49 (describing the elections that demonstrated a White 
voting bloc). Political cohesion was demonstrated at the district court level through regression 
analysis of statistically significant data drawn from five elections and presented at trial, which 
showed that voting was racially polarized. See id. at 1245–47 (rejecting the use of Precinct 248 and 
finding that “Blacks and Hispanics as one minority were politically cohesive” based on statistical 
evidence). For instance, candidate Mario Delgado received 83 percent of the minority votes, while 
receiving 37 percent of the White vote, and candidate Tony Campos received 63 percent of the 
minority vote, while receiving 29 percent of the White vote. Id. at 1249. Both lost their races for 
City Council Position 1, Delgado in 1986 and Campos in 1984. Id. 
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circumstances established a valid claim of vote dilution, based on 
racially polarized voting, “lingering socio-economic effects of past 
official discrimination,” and that no minority group member had been 
elected to city council.243 The Fifth Circuit affirmed a violation but 
vacated and remanded the judgment.244  
Soon thereafter, the debate shifted to a largely textual battle: 
whether the broad remedial purpose of the VRA or a rigid plain 
meaning should control its interpretation.245 This move to the latter 
interpretation is best demonstrated by Nixon v. Kent County,246 which 
disallowed aggregated claims under Section 2 based on its plain 
meaning.247 First, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc stated that Section 2 
never expressly or implicitly mentions coalitions.248 Second, Section 2 
uses many singular terms. For example, Section 2 protects an 
“individual’s” right to be free from discrimination,249 and the standard 
of proof refers to “a class of citizens.”250 Ostensibly, the court reasoned, 
if Section 2 allowed aggregation, it would say “classes of citizens” and 
refer to “their members,” not “its members.”251 Further, the committee 
reports from the 1975 and 1982 amendments never address 
aggregation.252 Finally, protected minorities, like all other groups, “join 
forces . . . to further their mutual political goals,” implying that these 
 
 243. Id. at 1249. The court ordered redistricting based on the City’s proposed plan, which 
created five single-member districts, one having a 65.9 percent minority population (44.6 percent 
Hispanic, 21.3 percent Black), and three council members elected at large. Id. at 1244. 
 244. Id. at 1250. The Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that both groups must 
be cohesive individually and cohesive as one community. It required only the latter. Id. at 1245.  
 245. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 894–98 (5th Cir. 
1993) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring). 
 246. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
 247. Id. at 1386. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) (protecting “the right of any 
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color”).  
 250. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386 (quoting 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b)); see § 10301(b) (declaring the 
statute has been violated when “political processes . . . are not equally open to participation by 
members of a class of citizens . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other members 
of the electorate to participate in the political process” (emphasis added)). 
 251. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386 (emphasis omitted). As noted, this Note argues that this text is 
implicitly there under the singular–plural canon of interpretation, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 1. See 1 
U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (explaining, absent “context indicat[ing] otherwise,” statutory interpretation 
requires that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things 
[and] words importing the plural include the singular”); infra Part III.B. 
 252. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1387.  
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aggregated claims were nothing more than political maneuvering, 
which is not protected by Section 2.253 
In his dissent, Judge Damon Keith wrote that Section 2 should be 
interpreted as a whole.254 First, the phrase “a class of citizens” is 
ambiguous because Section 2 protects multiple minorities, and it is not 
clear that a “class” must consist of only one group.255 Facially, 
differences in the class’s composition are irrelevant to Section 2. 
Claimants must simply meet the totality-of-the-circumstances test.256 
And interpreting “class” as a limitation on claimants’ rights is 
inconsistent with the broadening purpose of the 1982 amendment.257  
Further, Judge Keith relied extensively on Chisom v. Roemer,258 
where the Supreme Court held that the VRA should be given “the 
broadest possible scope.”259 In Chisom, the Court defined 
“representative” in Section 2 to include elected state judges, thus 
bringing state judicial elections within its ambit.260 The Court did so in 
part, because no one disputed “that [Section 2] applied to judicial 
elections prior to the 1982 amendment,”261 and if the 1982 amendment 
expanded liability, the Chisom Court reasoned that contracting Section 
2’s effect, so that it did not reach judicial elections, would be anomalous 
without an explicit indication from Congress.262 Using this presumption 
of the broadest scope possible, Judge Keith relied on two types of 
evidence of textual meaning to find that aggregated claims were 
allowed. First, the term “language minorities” was added in 1975 
before the allegedly limiting language of a “class” was added in 1982.263 
 
 253. Id. at 1391–92.  
 254. Id. at 1393 (Keith, J., dissenting).  
 255. Id. at 1394, 1398. 
 256. Id. at 1398–99. Judge Keith also argued that this reading was compelled by the fact that 
the attorney general had supported such claims, such as by filing an amicus brief in a failed appeal 
to the Supreme Court in the Campos litigation. Id. at 1397. Quite uniquely, the Court has often 
given the views of the attorney general on the VRA considerable deference and weight. See 
Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 508–09 (1992) (comparing this deference to 
Chevron deference).  
 257. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1399 (Keith, J., dissenting).  
 258. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991).  
 259. Id. at 403 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)); Nixon, 76 
F.3d at 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting). 
 260. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 399. 
 261. Id. at 390.  
 262. Id. at 402. 
 263. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1394, 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting).  
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Judge Keith concluded that the addition of “language minorities” gave 
these minorities full voting rights protection in 1975, which included 
the possibility of aggregated claims brought by racial and ethnic 
minorities.264 Thus, similar to Chisom, where no language or legislative 
history had shown an intent to contract the prior protection of the 
VRA over judicial elections, the same was true of protections to racial 
and language minorities.265 This view, that the term “language 
minorities” condoned aggregation, was partially driven by the second 
type of evidence. On that front, Judge Keith claimed that Congress was 
aware of aggregated (or, in Judge Keith’s words, joint or coalition) 
claims when it amended the VRA in 1975 and 1982.266 Thus, without 
further indication, Congress would not limit aggregation through the 
addition of “class” in 1982 in an amendment that broadened the scope 
of the VRA.267  
Finally, Judge Keith argued that the majority’s result created the 
same evils that the VRA was meant to end.268 The majority’s logic 
presupposed racial and ethnic homogeneity and “assume[d] automatic 
homogeneity of interest within and automatic divergence of interests 
between racial groups.”269 By doing so, the majority simply writes off 
the possibility of shared political goals because of a common history of 
 
 264. Id. at 1398.  
 265. See id. at 1399 (“Just as Chisom v. Roemer and Mallory refused to limit ‘representatives’ 
to legislators, we should refuse to limit ‘protected class’ to a single ethnic group protected under 
Section 2.”).  
 266. Namely, Judge Keith cited Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), where Black and 
Puerto Rican voters in New York brought a joint claim. Nixon, 76 F.2d at 1395 (Keith, J., 
dissenting) (citing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 52 (1964). Congress considered Wright at 
least at some point during the hearings for the VRA extensions in 1975. Extension of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965: Hearing on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S. 1409 and S. 1443 Before the Subcomm. 
on Const. Rts. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 965 (1975) [hereinafter Extension of 
the Voting Rights Act Hearing]. It also seems that there was another potential aggregated claim 
before Congress. See Sette, supra note 29, at 2707 & n.124, 2729 & n.382 (noting that Wright was 
a constitutional claim, but that the Senate Report mentioned another aggregated claim); infra 
note 313. The majority simply rejected this inference wholesale without much discussion because, 
in its view, Section 2 had never applied to aggregated claims, and so no inference from history 
could be made. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1389. 
 267. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1395 (Keith, J., dissenting) (“If Congress was thus aware that more 
than one minority group could be considered to constitute one plaintiff class in determining the 
availability of Voting Rights Act protection, certainly the absence of an explicit prohibition of 
minority coalition claims compels a construction of Section 2 which allows them.”).  
 268. Id. at 1400–02. Judge Keith also noted that courts do not conduct purity tests to see if the 
majority bloc is of “Italian, German or Yugoslavian descent.” Id. at 1402. 
 269. Id. at 1400. 
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discrimination.270 This assumption, which segregates and classifies 
minority groups, runs counter to the Constitution and purposes of the 
VRA, because these classifications will deny rights (and the 
subsequent remedies) under the VRA solely on the basis of race or 
ethnicity.271 
As a result of the competing remedial and textual approaches, 
there is uncertainty as to whether aggregation could be recognized 
under Section 2. Further uncertainty results from the fact that Bartlett’s 
impact on this divide remains unclear. Despite a somewhat lively 
scholarly debate surrounding the import of Bartlett, courts still 
recognize aggregated claims in jurisdictions that already allowed 
aggregated claims.272 The dearth of circuit court decisions addressing 
Bartlett likely stems from courts not being precluded from hearing 
aggregation claims. Further, the rationales for distinguishing crossover 
claims from aggregated claims undermine the arguments advanced by 
the circuits disallowing aggregation. First, with regard to the risk of 
interest group politics, the line drawing between single-minority group 
claims and aggregated claims is dubious at best.273 The fact that a 
community has a common goal should not bar representation that it is 
entitled to obtain via Section 2.274 Section 2 claims go far beyond 
common politics, requiring that claimants meet the Gingles 
preconditions and the totality-of-the-circumstances test.275 Second, 
although the VRA and its legislative history never explicitly mention 
aggregated districts as a remedy, the same is true for single-minority 
 
 270. Id. at 1401. 
 271. Id. at 1399–1400. 
 272. E.g., Huot v. City of Lowell, 280 F. Supp. 3d 228, 235–37 (D. Mass. 2017); Perez v. 
Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123, 143 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. Gwinnett 
Cnty. Bd. of Registrations & Elections, No. 1:16-cv-2852-AT, 2017 WL 4250535, at *1–2 (N.D. 
Ga. May 12, 2017); Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 231 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1048 (M.D. Ala. 
2017); Pope v. County of Albany, No. 1:11–cv–0736 (LEK/CFH), 2014 WL 316703, at *1, *6 
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014); Broward Citizens for Fair Dists. v. Broward Cnty., No. 12–60317–CIV, 
2012 WL 1110053, at *1, *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2012); Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 405 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of Albany, No. 
03-CV-502, 2003 WL 21524820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003); Memorandum of Law of Plaintiffs 
at 5, Hardial v. Town Council of the Town of Hempstead, No. CV-13 2452 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 
2013), 2013 WL 10230644. 
 273. See supra note 253 and accompanying text. 
 274. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 51 (1986) (requiring political cohesion under 
Section 2).  
 275. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
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group districts.276 Third, the Sixth Circuit and others rely on the text, 
particularly the singular nature of “class.”277 However, Judge Keith is 
likely right that “class” can include aggregated communities, because 
the VRA never defines “class.”278 These arguments are supported by 
the broad remedial nature of the VRA and by the fact that the evil 
solved by aggregated claims is the same as by single-minority group 
claims.279 
B. Novel Textual Arguments in Favor of Aggregated Claims 
Even assuming courts do not agree with Judge Keith’s 
interpretation that the singular “class” allows for aggregation, the 
opposition’s textual argument is undermined by the singular–plural 
canon of interpretation.280 Codified by Congress, this canon instructs 
that singular terms in statutes also include the plural form unless 
context shows otherwise.281 For example, if a statute proscribes the 
firing of “a rocket,” firing multiple rockets is also proscribed.282 The 
rocket statute would ban the simultaneous firing of multiple rockets 
taped together. Likewise, simultaneous discrimination against multiple 
protected groups is banned under Section 2. Thus, aggregated claims 
are still permissible under Section 2. 
Importantly, this interpretation does no violence to the text and 
helps ground the scope of Section 2. Again, Section 2 reads:  
 
 276. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 31 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“There is nothing 
in the statutory text to suggest that Congress meant to protect minority opportunity to elect solely 
by the creation of majority-minority districts.”). 
 277. E.g., Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386–87 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The Fourth 
Circuit relied upon Section 2’s language that members of a class have “less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate.” Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 425 n.5, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018)).  
 278. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1394, 1403 (Keith, J., dissenting).  
 279. Id. at 1394, 1402. 
 280. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“[U]nless the context indicates otherwise—words importing the 
singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things . . . .”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra 
note 32, at 130 (referring to the singular–plural canon as “simply a matter of common sense and 
everyday linguistic experience”). This is also recognized in many states. See, e.g., MICH. CODE 
ANN. § 125.402 (2019) (“[T]he singular number includes the plural and the plural the 
singular . . . .”). Admittedly, no one else advances the singular–plural argument for Section 2, this 
Note found, but others have made it for other sections of the VRA. See Travis Crum, Note, The 
Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 
YALE L.J. 1992, 2007 n.88 (2010) (using this argument in the context of Section 3 of the VRA). 
 281. 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 282. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 32, at 130. 
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if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have 
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate 
in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.283 
Applying the singular–plural canon, absent some indication that 
Congress did not want aggregated claims, this can also be logically read 
as allowing claims when “members of classes of citizens” are not 
equally allowed to participate, “in that their members have less 
opportunity . . . to participate.” Thus, the singular form encapsulates a 
single-minority group’s claims, alleging discrimination against “a 
class.” The natural way to make sense of “classes” then is that 
claimants can assert discriminatory effects befalling more than one 
minority group simultaneously.  
Several pieces of textual evidence confirm this interpretation. 
First, Congress codified this canon through the Dictionary Act, 
essentially telling readers that, “unless the context indicates 
otherwise,”284 the term “a class” imports the term “classes.” This 
reading is supported by the drafting manuals in the House and Senate, 
which apply the same presumption of singularity unless Congress 
intends to deviate.285 And the context of Section 2 does not justify a 
 
 283. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018).  
 284. 1 U.S.C. § 1; see FDIC v. RBS Sec., Inc., 798 F.3d 244, 258 (5th Cir. 2015) (acknowledging 
the authority of the Dictionary Act as the “default rule that the singular includes the plural”); 2A 
NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:34 (7th 
ed.), Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2020) (“These rules reflect the common understanding that 
the English language does not always carefully differentiate between singular and plural word 
forms . . . .”). But see United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 422 n.5 (2009) (stating in dicta that the 
Court traditionally applied the Dictionary Act’s singular–plural rule when “necessary to carry out 
the evident intent of the statute” (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657 (1924))); 
id. at 432 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s characterization of the singular–
plural canon is “contrary” to the text of the Dictionary Act). Not only has Hayes not been 
generative, but the Court has also not applied this narrow construction of the Dictionary Act 
consistently. Cf., e.g., Return Mail, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 139 S. Ct. 1853, 1857 (2019) (noting 
that the Dictionary Act’s canon that the term “person” includes the federal government is “an 
express directive from Congress”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707–08 
(2014) (relying on the Dictionary Act canon that “person” includes a corporation); Carr v. United 
States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010) (describing the canon that the present tense includes the present 
and future tense as a presumption created by the Dictionary Act). 
 285. See OFF. OF THE LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. SENATE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING MANUAL 5 (1997), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/SenateOfficeoftheLegislativeCounsel_
LegislativeDraftingManual%281997%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT2N-7EZ5] (“The singular includes 
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deviation from this presumption because of the consistent use of the 
singular form when referring to “class” throughout Section 2.  
Congress’s unwavering usage of the singular form of “class” 
throughout Section 2 and the rest of the VRA suggests a consistent 
stylistic or grammatical choice, rather than an intent to exclude the 
plural.286 Not once in the whole of Title 52 of the U.S. Code did 
Congress use the term “classes.”287 And the singular form of class is 
reserved almost exclusively in the VRA for Section 2, which is 
consistent with (if not implying) a unique meaning for groups who can 
bring claims under Section 2.288 When referencing those entitled to 
protections, the rest of the statute refers to them as “language 
minorities,” “language minority groups,” “minority persons,” 
“minority group[s],” or as “minority group citizens.”289 The 1982 
amendments thus have a virtual monopoly on the term, and the 
linguistic distance between class and the panoply of other terms used 
to reference minority groups likely means that the former is not totally 
coextensive with the latter. Or at the very least, the former under the 
singular–plural canon can support a broader meaning than the latter. 
 
the plural . . . .”); OFF. OF THE LEGIS. COUNS., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE 
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL’S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE 60 (1995), https://legcounsel.house.gov/
sites/legcounsel.house.gov/files/documents/draftstyle.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ4D-VKWV] (instructing 
legislators to “[a]void plurals”); see also FREDERICK REED DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 67 
(1954) (“To the extent your meaning allows, use the singular instead of the plural.”); FREDERICK REED 
DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL DRAFTING 124–25 (1965) (same). Three Justices 
indicated that drafting manuals can be a source of statutory interpretation in Carr. See Carr, 560 U.S. 
at 459, 463 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J. & Ginsburg, J.) (applying a rule of construction 
drawn from legislative drafting manuals). 
 286. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).  
 287. This was confirmed through the following Westlaw search: limited to results within Title 
52 of the United States Code Annotated: “adv.: class!” and then sifting through the minimal 
references for both the plural and singular terms.  
 288. In the VRA, the term “class” is used outside of Section 2 only in 52 U.S.C. §§ 10501(b), 
10303(c). It was first included in the original act in 1965, but only once, when referring to a 
prohibited test or device used to “prove [the voter’s] qualifications by the voucher of registered 
voters or members of any other class.” It was not used in the 1975, 1992, or 2006 amendments. See 
generally Pub. L. No. 94-73, Title I, § 102, 89 Stat. 400 (1975); Pub. L. No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 
(1992); Pub. L. No. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). And, while the 1970 amendments used the term 
once, it was only in the context of moving the test or device text of the 1965 Act verbatim. See 
generally Pub. L. No. 91-285, Title II, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970). 
 289. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(a)(1)(F)(iii), (a)(2), 10310(c)(3), 10503(a). And in its 2006 
reauthorization factual findings, Congress called these individuals “racial and language minority 
voters” or “racial and language minority citizens,” never referring to either individually as 
composing or being part of a “class.” 120 Stat. 577, 578. 
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Moreover, Congress already approved of aggregation in the 
context of language minorities. Language minority groups explicitly 
include multiethnic, multicultural, and most importantly multilingual 
groups.290 Asians could have diverse lingual and cultural ties—and yet 
still get the protection of Section 2, even collectively. Chinese and Thai 
communities could qualify as individual classes or form an aggregate 
Asian class under Section 2. Further, Hispanic groups can be composed 
of members with ethnic ties to Spain, Peru, and Mexico, all while 
meeting the statutory definition of being “of Spanish heritage.”291 All 
of these demonstrate that plurality is not inconsistent with the statute 
and is in fact more consistent with the statute than rigidly imposing 
singularity. From this point of view, the Nixon majority started with the 
wrong presumption from consistent singularity. Instead of presuming 
the text as encompassing “class” and “classes,” as Congress instructed, 
the Nixon court presumed that the text excluded the plural.  
Further evidence of context shows that the term “class” is 
generally uninstructive to readers because of how disconnected it is 
from other sections of the statute defining language minorities.292 The 
statute refers to citizens of a “language minority group,” or “language 
minorities,” and never directly refers to them as classes—and Section 
2 indirectly considers them part of the term protected class.293 And 
Congress ostensibly knows how to clarify whether it meant only one 
protected group of citizens. For example, in § 10303, Congress 
outlawed certain English-only ballots if more than 5 percent of voting-
age citizens were from “a single language minority.”294 Likewise, if 
Congress really wanted to be clear, it could have said “a single group” 
or “a single class.” Still, at worst, this type of evidence reinforces the 
ambiguity here. After all, the reason why this circuit split is tough to 
resolve is specifically because Congress uses language inconsistently, 
with little clarity and precision. But the whole purpose of textual 
canons of construction is to break ties when there is ambiguity. Thus, 
 
 290. See Sette, supra note 29, at 2728 (noting the inherent coalitional aspect of language 
minorities). 
 291. 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3). 
 292. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (using “class” without any definition of language 
minorities); id. § 10503(c) (referencing “the language of the applicable minority group”); id. 
§ 10503(e) (“[T]he term ‘language minorities’ or ‘language minority group’ means persons who 
are American Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives, or of Spanish heritage.”).  
 293. Id. § 10503(c).  
 294. Id. § 10303(f)(3). 
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courts should defer to Congress’s judgment, and not their own, on 
which types of claims should be allowed.295  
Additionally, the other phrasing of Section 2 does not foreclose 
the use of this canon. Although the VRA refers to “members of a class 
of citizens,” this phrasing is simply the most natural way to discuss 
individuals in a group—since a group will be bringing the claim.296 And 
while at least one court reasoned that “other members of the 
electorate” precludes coalitional claims, at least in the crossover 
context, because it is totally exclusionary of any other group, this view 
simply fails to contemplate the possibility of aggregation and 
community-building.297 Read plainly, the term “other” is made in 
reference to groups that have more opportunity “to participate in the 
political process.”298 At least in the context of a single-minority group 
community’s claim, which asserts that it has “less opportunity,” “other 
members” refers to those who are not members of that community. 
When two or more minority communities assert a claim in the 
aggregate, the “other members of the electorate” are those who are not 
members of any one of those communities asserting the claim. 
Admittedly, the article (“a”) that precedes “class” could indicate 
that the word “classes” was not intended. However, “a” is an indefinite 
article, and courts generally treat indefinite articles as allowing both 
singular and plural terms.299 By contrast, definite articles, like “the,” 
are more likely to lock in a selected form.300 For example, Congress 
 
 295. Although Congress could then amend Section 2 if it did not like these claims, this 
argument suffers from a “dog that didn’t bark” critique. This reasoning may be stronger from the 
fact that Congress specifically amended the VRA after Campos and Hardee County Board 
allowed such claims and again in 2006 after this circuit split arose. See discussion supra notes 236–
36 and accompanying text.  
 296. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added).  
 297. This is more or less the argument made in Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
 298. Id.  
 299. See 2A DALLAS SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:34 (4th ed. 
1972) (“It is most often ruled that a term introduced by ‘a’ or ‘an’ applies to multiple subjects or 
objects unless there is a reason to find that singular application was intended or is reasonably 
understood.”); see, e.g., United States v. Pendergrass, No. 1:17-CR-315-LMM-JKL, 2019 WL 
1376745, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2019) (applying the Dictionary Act’s singular–plural 
interpretation); In re Cell Tower Recs. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D), 90 F. Supp. 3d 673, 676–77 
(S.D. Tex. 2015) (same). This is also the rule in patent law. E.g., Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. 
Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338, 1342–43 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 300. E.g., Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc., 764 F.3d 1199, 
1227 (10th Cir. 2014); Frazier v. Pioneer Ams. LLC, 455 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2006); Lunsford 
v. Mills, 766 S.E.2d 297, 302 (N.C. 2014). 
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could have written “the class” or “said class.” And the rule regarding 
indefinite articles makes grammatical sense because Congress would 
never write “members of class of citizens.” Congress’s choice to make 
the singular noun grammatically correct should not exclude the plural. 
Such an interpretation would undermine the very reason for the 
singular–plural canon.301  
Further, presuming “classes” from the text is consistent with the 
context of the VRA because Congress added subsection (b), which 
contains the term “class,” in the 1982 amendment, and significantly 
expanded the scope of Section 2—and especially because language 
minorities already have access to aggregation.302 It would be 
incongruent to interpret subsection (b) as a severe limitation on the 
rights of claimants.303  
Even the Nixon court admitted that the statutory inclusion of 
“classes” would permit aggregation.304 However, the word class 
necessarily implies the existence of multiple classes, and the existence 
of “classes” in Section 2 is more consistent with the presumptions set 
up by the Dictionary Act and the singular–plural canon.  
Finally, although opponents state that Congress never meant to 
validate aggregated claims with the VRA,305 “prohibitions often go 
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”306 
Nowhere more pertinent is this philosophy than in the context of the 
VRA, which was meant to “overcome systematic and ingenious 
discrimination,” and “ensure the right to vote when local officials are 
determined to deny it.”307 Congress in 1965 stressed “both the variety 
 
 301. Proving that “a” precedes singular nouns does not counter this argument. No one would 
argue that “a class” is plural. Instead, the context of the statute does not undermine the 
importation of “classes” mandated by the Dictionary Act. At best, “a” is ambiguous, and a single 
word should not be the reason for the disallowance of aggregation. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“[Congress] does not, one might say, hide elephants in 
mouseholes.”). 
 302. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (describing Congress’s intent when 
amending Section 2).  
 303. The apparent limitations on the 1982 amendment seem to be explicitly enumerated in 
the Senate Report, and none of them mention aggregation. See id. at 46 (describing the limitations 
in the Senate Report); see discussion supra note 104. 
 304. Nixon v. Kent Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc).  
 305. See id. at 1390 (concluding that neither the original statute nor the subsequent 
amendments “reflect a broad and boundless ‘trend’ to expand the Act . . . to protect combinations 
of classes not described in the Act, including coalition minorities”).  
 306. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).  
 307. Johnson, supra note 59.  
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of means used” as well as “the durability” of the attacks on voting 
rights.308 Consistently, Congress has expanded the VRA, rejecting 
multiple attempts by the courts to limit its reach. Now the VRA is given 
the “broadest possible scope,”309 to eliminate the “broad array of 
dilution schemes . . . employed to cancel the impact” of minority 
votes.310 That is because both the VRA and Section 2 reflect a goal, a 
standard to be reached, not a formalistic rule. That standard is to reach 
equal opportunity in electoral politics, a desire in tension with the 
existence of myriad schemes of discrimination that constantly contort 
into new forms, the ingenuity of which “seems endless.”311  
Aggregation targets the same evil—racial and ethnic 
discrimination in voting—as single minority group claims. The Senate 
Report for the 1975 VRA amendments—that added language minority 
protection—confirms as much.312 The Senate noted how language 
minorities were treated “like [B]lacks throughout the South,” and how 
Mexican Americans in Texas, who exemplified language minority 
treatment, together with Black Texans faced a long history of 
mistreatment “similar to the myriad forms of discrimination practiced 
against [B]lacks in the South.”313 Disallowing aggregation is to say that 
 
 308. H.R. REP. NO. 89-439, at 8 (1965). 
 309. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403 (1991).  
 310. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6 (1982); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 
(1966) (stating that the VRA’s purpose is to fight the “insidious and pervasive evil which had been 
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance”). 
 311. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 6. 
 312. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25–28 (1975).  
 313. Id. at 25. There were at least two cases in which joint or proto-aggregated claims were 
considered by courts and by the Senate in 1975. First, Wright v. Rockefeller was referred to several 
times in a Senate hearing and involved a form of joint (albeit a constitutional and not statutory) 
claim brought by Puerto Rican and Black New Yorkers. Extension of the Voting Rights Act 
Hearing, supra note 266, at 249, 965; Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964); Nixon v. Kent 
Cnty., 76 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) (citing Wright); Sette, supra note 
29, at 2707 n.124 (noting that Wright was a constitutional and not a statutory claim). Second, the 
Senate Report refers to a 1972 Texas court case brought by Mexican American and Black voters 
that was partially affirmed by the Supreme Court. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25; Graves v. Barnes 
(Graves I), 343 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff’d in part White v. Regester (White I), 412 U.S. 
755 (1973). While the initial order of the district court in 1972, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
seems to have only dealt with separate claims by Black voters for Dallas County and Mexican 
American voters for Bexar County because of time constraints, later opinions addressed proto-
aggregated claims and required the drawing of single-member districts based on combined 
Mexican American and Black populations with histories of discrimination. Graves v. Barnes 
(Graves II), 378 F. Supp. 640, 644–62 (W.D. Tex. 1974), vacated by White v. Regester (White II), 
422 U.S. 935, 935–36 (1975) (per curiam) (vacating the case, “[r]ather than render an unnecessary 
judgment on the validity of the constitutional views expressed by the District Court,” for the 
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discrimination is fine so long as it affects two minority groups instead 
of one. The gap between traditional and aggregated claims is a 
difference in degree, not form.  
CONCLUSION 
Bartlett represented a significant shift in voting rights but not one 
that precludes aggregation. The end of crossover claims does not mean 
the end of aggregated claims because aggregated claims meet the same 
objectives of the VRA as with single-minority group claims. More 
broadly, aggregated claims align with the spirit of the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which was “not designed to punish for the past” but “to 
ensure a better future.”314 From the standpoint of electoral 
representation and voting rights, this country has come a long way. But 
to appreciate the past is hardly to observe the realities of the present. 
Representation at all levels of government, while it is not the be-all and 
end-all, is a critical value in a diverse society. And aggregated claims 
can help communities increase representation they deserve. At the end 
of the day, that representation is a proxy, but a useful one, for whether 
minority groups have equal opportunity in the electoral process. The 
VRA played a large role in ensuring a better future for Americans of 
all backgrounds, so that they can not only vote but also know that their 
vote means something. And the VRA’s promise should apply no less 
when discrimination occurs against multiple groups because racism 
should not thrive by targeting two and not one. 
 
 
district court to consider recent apportionment legislation enacted in Texas). While the 1974 
decision was not directly addressed in the Senate Report, the developments of this case were 
addressed in a hearing that was cited in the same discussion of the Senate Report. Extension of 
the Voting Rights Act, supra note 266, at 490 (referring implicitly to the 1974 Graves II case by 
citing to White v. Regester—the 1973 case in which the Supreme Court partially affirmed the 
district court in Graves I—and referencing the 1974 developments of Graves I in which the Texas 
court “ruled the use of the at-large scheme to be unconstitutional”); S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 27 
(citing page 490 of the hearings); see also Extension of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 266, at 
476 (citing explicitly Graves II). 
 314. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 553 (2013). 
